Assess the view that appeasement was the only realistic option for British policy towards Germany between 1936 and 1938 The erosion of Neville Chamberlain’s# reputation was brought about quickly as his policy of appeasement failed to prevent WW2. The Cato# collective branded him as a criminal in the ‘Guilty men’#. Churchill# further reinforced this view telling the commons “England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war.”#. These more orthodox views starkly contrast the reactions of the public and media pre-war. Hailed as a hero “Most newspapers supported Chamberlain uncritically, and he received thousands of gifts, from a silver dinner service to many of his trademark umbrellas.”#, with …show more content…
The peace ballot is the most valuable source as it is simply so extensive and balances any anomalous results, compared to say, 400 Oxford students. Their representation is also useful as it the public’s opinion just before the Rhineland re-occupation. So in this case shows that there was already a majority in favour for using force, if necessary, even though nothing like the Rhine had happened yet. Between 1936 and 1938 the public’s sentiment seemed to change. While 5,000 supporters gathered outside 10 Downing street for Chamberlain, 16,000 were demonstrating at Trafalgar Square, after Munich. The mass media reported the supporters but not the protesters. This bias which is also shown to journalists such as Norman Ebbut could be the reason why public opinion started to sway on such a scale, so late. If Chamberlain did have public support, other options to appeasement would have been more realistic. The censorship of Ebbut’s writings and his withdrawl from Berlin, which is reciprocated through the majority of mass media, is an important source as it would mean that Baldwin and Chamberlain would not have the public support to rearm in the early to mid part of the 30’s. Disproving this, though, Sir Walter Citrine# in 1935 :“There is no alternative left to us now but the applying of sanctions, including the possibility of War”.#As he is head of the TUC# it could be argued that he speaks for the
The year was 1940; the world’s second great World War was in full swing, with Britain and Germany at the forefront. The fall of Britain’s closest ally, France, stunned the British Empire and threw it into disarray. Through the chaos, Winston Churchill emerged. Churchill would be an inspiring leader who was able to rally the entire nation in times of hardship. Through his leadership, the “British Bulldog” would face the Axis powers and come out victorious, as well as become a public hero for the British people. Yet, immediately after the war, Churchill did not return to the prime minister seat because of a shocking defeat in his re-election, despite his immense reputation he gained from the war. Though lauded by the British population for his prowess as a wartime leader, Churchill’s conservative politics were out of touch with a population ready for post-war relief and led to his defeat in the 1945 election.
Ulrich Herbert’s “Good Times, Bad Times” is about the contrast between the ways typical working Germans perceived the years before and during Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, his rise to dictator, and during and after and World War II. The article cites a survey conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie (Public Opinion Institute) in 1949, as well as an oral-history project conducted at the universities of Essen and Hagen between 1930-1960. Both studies
If Britain and France had abandoned their policy of appeasement and retaliated against Hitler's aggression war could have been averted. Appeasement was deeply embedded into British foreign policy, even to the the extent were they would not honor their military commitments to France under the Treaty of Locarno, that if Germany were to remilitarise the Rhineland, Britain would offer them support. So, when Hitler ordered armed cars to enter the Rhineland in March 1936, France failed to retaliate. This was the ideal time to have halted Hitler as Allan Bullock quotes Hitler saying “If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs”, because Germany was still militarily weak and war would have lasted six weeks rather than six years. However, the appeasers were determined to stop any violence, that they failed to see, according to Keith Eubank, had they “retaliated against the remilitarisation with force, the German military units would have withdrawn and perhaps Hitler would have been overthrown; the drift to war would have been halted and World War II averted”.
In 1939 the world plunged into a state of depression and war, each country turning on one another. Diplomatic factors, Hitler's thirst for power, and the political and financial stand point are arrows that point directly to a future of destruction and war, all with the failure of appeasement. Collective security worked as a buffer between conflicts, and was the best response toward aggression. The weakening League of Nations failed to keep collective security intact from any wars. Hitler's leadership threatened the peace in Europe which caused Germany to stir up war around the world. The economic and political stand points were in danger and on the verge of collapsing.
Even before the climactic World War II, Churchill’s mental war starts with the Indian Independence movement. Churchill was brusque about his opinion on the movement, knowingly showing his opposition to the public. “To Churchill, all Indians were the pedestal for a throne. He would have died to keep England free, but was against those who wanted India free.(Tondon, n.d.)” With this ornery still in the mind of the public and government officials, Churchill’s 1940 election was met with opposition. In Churchill and Orwell, “Peter Eckersley, a Tory MP, predicted that “Winston won’t last five months.”(Ricks, pg. 91)” The general public were critical of such a disposition leading the United Kingdom during a time struggle. Even with the public’s pessimistic prospect of him, Churchill’s resilience will become a favorable trait to exhibit in this psychological war.
Appeasement was a less effective response to aggression because fewer countries agreed with the Munich Agreement. Some of Adolf Hitler’s ideas were stated in Document 1 such as needing colonies in order to enter colonial politics and that oppressed territories were not demoted to nothing by protests but by countries with stronger military forces. Haile Selassie, the emperor of Ethiopia, asked the League of Nations fro help in stopping the invasion after Italy attacked Ethiopia. When the League of Nations’ response was ineffective, Selassie stated “God and history will remember your judgment. It is us today. It will be you tomorrow.” (Doc.2). This statement is like karma; because the League of Nations didn’t help Ethiopia, it would be attacked and get no help. This statement is in the point of view of Ethiopian people, but also for other European countries because when countries are without help, the country it asks will later be without help also. They will be in the same situation as the country asking for its help; “It is us today. It will be you tomorrow.” Document 5 is in the point of view of the British. Document 5
The Final Solution is the most controversial topic of German History as its origination is not clean cut, whilst it would be simple to place emphasis on Hitler and his World View for the destruction of all Jewry there are other factors such as WW2 which must be taken into consideration in analysis of the Final Solution. Other factors include the polarised view of a lack of formal mechanisms and coherent policy, both of which were fuelled by an honest desire to pursue the will of the Fuhrer to commit, as described by Layton ‘The darkest deed of the Third Reich.’ Throughout this essay it will be
xviii. Aggressive foreign policy - Germany marched into the Rhineland (1936) and many other things like Austria and the Sudetenland (1938)
However, British and French military intervention in the Rhineland incident, 1936 could have been an alternative to appeasement. Their reluctance to take action permitted Germany to increase her power (within 18 months Germany’s rate of rearmament surpassed that of Britain and France), whilst also contributing to the burgeoning belief that the League of Nations was ineffective. Hitler himself stated that "If France had then marched into the Rhineland; we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs." Indeed, many historians concur as invading the
Appeasement was merely a catalyst that aids in the materialization of Hitler’s ambitions which was the main driving force to Hitler’s expansionist policies. Appeasement is a policy of making material concessions to an enemy power which is Adolf Hitler, the dictator of Germany in this context in order to avoid conflict and maintain peace. Main driving force can also be defined as the biggest motivation for Hitler to pursue his expansionist policies which is his ideas of establishing Lebenstraum and Greater Germany. Thus, appeasement to a small extent, is the main driving force behind Hitler’s expansionist policies.
that Hitler was a “sincere man who had no intention to provoke a war.” He too,
German history is seen as a ‘painful issue for thousands of Germans and other Europeans’ . However it has interested many historians over the years into inquiring how and why Hitler came to power and how much of this was to do with the failure of parliamentary democracy in Germany. To fully ascertain to what extent these events have in common and what reasons led to the fall of democracy and rise of the Nazis, each have to be looked at individually. Also it seems beneficial, to be able to evaluate these in the relevant context, to look at the situation in Germany was in prior to 1920.
Means is British was dissatisfied with Nazi and Hitler. Also this effected British's attitude to
Therefore, the humiliating Treaty came as a rude shock to the German people who, correspondingly, blamed the politicians for betraying the soldiers in signing the armistice and saw them as compounding their treason by accepting the peace settlement. They spoke of the ‘November criminals’ and protested “A nation of seventy million suffers, but does not die.” These factors propagated in the promotion of anti republican feeling, the conclusions of which were clearly reflected in the results of the election of June 1920.
In order to fully understand how Britain’s decision to go to war against Germany is best explained one must engage into the debate revolving around the question of the extent to which Britain and other countries were responsible for causing war. This helps explain the intention Britain had for war which is vital in understanding their decision making process to cause war in the first place. Some schools of thought have come to the conclusion that it was everybody or nobody- the continent “slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay.”1 That analysis will be considered in this essay as will the widespread thesis that it was Germany’s aggression which not only created the preconditions for war, but also triggered Britain into war with the political imbalance of power being created from the growing naval and colonial expansion of Germany. Other factors that help explain why Britain went to war against Germany