Carl Von Clausewitz And Helmuth Moltke The Elder

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region,

In the year of 1792, a twelve year old boy named Carl von Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army for war, and soon after appearing in such battles as Jena-Auerstädt and Waterloo, became dedicated in conflict and its reasons for their results most of his life. By being alive at the same time as Napoleon's rise and fall, Carl von Clausewitz was able to document and relate how war was fought, won, and lost. It's important to comprehend that in his writings, he is relaying why it is pertinent to think about how war is fought, not how to win a war. Clausewitz' theories described in “On War,” are not only effective in wars fought in today's time and past, but will remain current in future endeavors, due to its generic layout of

This paper takes a look at the “victory disease” as illustrated in the historic example of the Battle of Little Bighorn when Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer and 210 of his men where annihilated by some 2500 warriors from the Sioux and Cheyenne Indian nations. Throughout history the United States military has suffered from an invincible mentality, arrogance, and complacency all built upon by numerous victories and a national psyche that creates military leaders who expect overwhelming victories in any armed conflict we find ourselves in. The Battle of the Little Bighorn embodies many of the “victory disease” symptoms, as evidenced by LTC Custer’s over confidence and failure to follow orders. Historians and scholars continue to analyze and critiqued the decisions made in combat by our military leaders, for those decisions we make in combat effect the lives of many. This paper will attempt to re-dissect the battle and Custer’s decisions in an attempt to find additional courses of actions that may have been taken, and learn from his analytic mistakes.

The development of the allied military strategy in World War II (WWII) presented challenges for the U.S. and Great Britain as they worked together to defeat the Axis powers. First, this paper will review the environment at the time of WWII when Admiral Stark penned the “Plan Dog” memorandum and MAJ Wedemeyer’s War Defense Team put together the “Victory Plan”. Next, it will look at the advantages and disadvantages of coalition operations with supporting examples. Then, a review of two major meetings between U.S. and Great Britain will identify what strategic decisions were made and the effects they have on the war. Finally, this paper will explore the foundations of strategy (Clausewitz and Sun Tzu) by which the allied forces used and

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

Airpower’s contribution to the Allied victory did not represent the ultimate fulfillment of the prophecies and predictions that were raised in the interwar period. Airpower theorists, on both sides of the Atlantic, advocated predictions and prophecies for the future of warfare. They strongly supported ideas and expectations that airpower and especially strategic bombardment was the best answer in the quest for decisive victory. Airpower was the end and the means to destroy the enemy’s will to fight. However, the Trenchardian notion that decisive victory would come through the cumulative moral effect of aerial bombing proved false because German citizens showed a remarkable resilience to surrender. Moreover, the Allies’ rhetoric that bombers “would always get through” was far from the reality and resulted in a tremendous number of aircraft losses and fatalities. Finally, the prediction that the airpower can win alone was an overestimated expectation albeit, airpower played a significant role, the decisive victory came as result of a larger joint effort by all the services.

The influence of various theories and concepts on the conduct World War I has generated a range of studies in an attempt to understand how and why World War I was fought. Specifically, Clausewitz’s theories on warfare have come under a considerable amount of scrutiny with regards to their influence on World War I. This scrutiny has led to the ascertation that the protracted and bloody stalemate of World War I was largely due to a stubborn reliance on Clausewitz’s theories. The question that this paper attempts to address is weather the cause of the bloody and protracted

This mission command analysis evaluates the battle of Team Desobry at the town of Noville, Belgium. These events took place 18-19 December 1944, and later impacted the battle fought at Bastogne during World War II. It is the goal of this review to discuss and analyze three mission command principles displayed during this battle: Create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, and the acceptance of prudent risk. One of the main characters that took part in this story was the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, 10th Armored Division. The commanding officer of this element was Major William R. Desobry. During the events of World War II, the German forces were trying to gain control of the Ardennes to cut off the allies’ supply lines in order to isolate British forces from the American troops. A pivotal task for German forces to attain this goal was to gain access and take control of the Belgian town of Bastogne. However, an important strategic stepping stone to get there was Noville, which is just seven kilometers northeast of Bastogne. Two main reasons made Noville such a critical location for the Germans: First, it had a junction of roads that were important for displacement of German forces to the West. Second, it provided an alternative road to access Bastogne from the north.1

The Napoleonic Era is an example of Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) and is fundamentally relevant today. During the Napoleonic Era many scholars studied the techniques used during his nearly twenty years of military success two of the more famous scholars is Clausewitz and Jomini. Both scholars were on Napoleons staff and learned a lot from failure as well as success. During my paper I will discuss three main points that represent a few of Napoleons contributes to the current military. The first point will be the change from dynastic armies to ideological nationalism. This change was valuable because the army called for volunteers and most of the population supported the revolution.2 The second point will be Napoleons ability to master maneuver wafare. Clausewitz and Jomini were two military scholars that studied Napoleon’s techniques used during his nearly twenty years of military success. They both took differenc

Although German clearly had the advantage and benefit of possessing the greatest tactical, technological, and operationally advanced military in the world for the majority of the war, yet they overestimated their abilities and allowed their resentment to skew military objectives and hinder efforts to connect Germany’s end, ways and

MANY ARGUE THAT AMERICA GENERALLY ENTERS A WAR UNPREPARED. DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS THESIS OR NOT?

These politics do not have to be just foreign or international politics, but also domestic politics. To achieve these objectives, Clausewitz believed in two levels of war: strategic and tactical (Echevarria, 1995). One must also remember that Clausewitz did not believe war could be down to a science, it is far too diverse and unpredictable. He was a strong believer that a theory is an explanation, not a solution. In “On War” Clausewitz states, "the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled” (Clausewitz, 1832). His theory harps on this idea that if conflict of politics reaches an emotional high, organized violence can breakout. Clausewitz’s theory today is taught with “policy” and “politics” as interchangeable components. However, Clausewitz created his theory based around a dual meaning. He believed war could lose sight of its policy aims, but war could never escape politics. On this basis, he combined three forces into one, which is referred to as ‘wondrous trinity’ (Echevarría 1995).