6.0 Ownership Structure: Shaw communications equity structure is comprised of series A shares and series B shares. Series B shares trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange, and 50% of these shares are owned by the top 25 shareholders. 40% of the shares are owned by financial institutions as part of their investment portfolios. Only 12% of the shares are owned by insiders, i.e. Shaw family and/or executives. Since these shares don’t have voting options, their ownership is mainly for capital gain and dividend purposes. On the other hand, series A shares have an embedded voting option, and 78% of the shares are owned by the Shaw family within the Shaw Family Living Trust (SFLT1). Therefore, Shaw family has total control of the company’s decisions. This increases the overall risk to the firm as ordinary shareholders have no say over the operations of the firm. The main implication is agency risk, as no one can exercise a final vote but the Shaw family. Company decisions could be biased towards Shaw family’s interest, and not in the best interest of other shareholders. Bad signals could make investors to withdraw their investments from the company, and Shaw’s market capitalization would plummet. The dual class structure and the current ownership structure increases the operating risk, and hence the required rate of return for equity. As a consequence the WACC of the firm is deemed to increase. 7.0 Market Value of Capital Structure: As of August 31st, 2015, Shaw Communications’
Managers and shareholders are the utmost contributors of these conflicts, hence affecting the entire structural organization of a company, its managerial system and eventually to the company's societal responsibility. A corporation is well organized with stipulated division of responsibilities among the arms of the organizational structure, shareholders, directors, managers and corporate officers. However, conflicts between managers in most firms and shareholders have brought about agency problems. Shares and their trade have seen many companies rise to big investments. Shareholders keep the companies running
The main concerns of this case are the way the shareholder stock will be handle (valued) and what the profitable advantages in acquiring Nicholson 's majority shares.
So investors should worry that Alibaba wouldn’t be share a significant amount of the value created with them over the time. Actually, lots of global public companies have a large shareholder with a lock on control, but normally controlling shareholders often won a substantial portion of the equity capital that provides them with beneficial incentives. In the case of Alibaba, investors need to worry about the relatively small stake held by the members of the controlling Alibaba Partnership (Bebchuk, 2014). All those factors shows Alibaba’s structure does not provide adequate protections to public investors. So investors expect Alibaba changes its Corporate Governance strategy, for instance Jack Ma need to reduce his stake in Alibaba within 5 years, including by having shares in Alibaba granted to Alibaba employees. It also should give more power to the shareholder’s to guarantee shareholder’s right which will seeks to allay investor concerns. If Alibaba change their strategy, giving its stockholders’ strong confidence, the business success of Alibaba might be large enough to make up for the costs of diversions and give public investors with good returns on their investment in the
While they have arrangement and discharging control over the directors of the enterprise, shareholders in expansive organizations, for example, the criminogenic Shell, Exxon, Occidental Petroleum, Union Carbide, Dow Chemical, Ford Motors, La Roche-Hoffman, BHP, A.H. Robins, General Electric, Johns-Manville, James Hardie, all enterprises whose disregard and willful dismissal of surely understood norms of conduct has brought about shocking mischief, have minimal impetus to guarantee that these supervisors carry on legitimately. This happens because financial specialists who don't lawfully own the property of the company used to do any harm, they have no individual legitimate obligation regarding any such damages brought about by the misapplication of that property. The rich shareholders who are continually telling the riches less and poor people to be responsible and in charge of the route, in which they act and live, are, in law, unreliable for the (regularly detestable) behavior of their companies. It deteriorates the
The company believes that the executives and directors should own the stocks. In order to be a stockholder,
The law gives corporate managers a great deal of flexibility in determining their capital and governance structure, relying on the market for capital to create competition that will allow shareholders to "choose" the one they think is best.
The 2006 governance reform at Rim seems not work well. There was not only the non-compliance with regulations or accounting errors, but also drastic fall of company’s shares due to strategic and operational issues. The probe of the Ontario Securities Commission and Securities Stock Exchange Commission, along with the concern of institutional investors, especially Northwest and Ethical investment, forced RIM to look at its leadership and reform its board structure in 2011. This paper will assess RIM’s board structure in 2011 and present some recommendations to improve RIM’s governance and board structure.
Shareholders need Comcast to define accurately the goals and to formulate the company’s mission, vision, strategies, and actions. This action will provide information of what the company will do to protect and enhance its investments and profits. Another need the shareholders want is for management to measure and assess Comcast actions against its outcomes. Shareholders want management to provide clarity in the company’s expectations, and accountability for its actions. In addition, shareholders need the performance levels at a satisfactory level, ability to obtain more shares, and to surrender ownership. Furthermore, shareholders need management to prepare strategies more approachable and subtle to the needs and desires of its region.
In the corporate form of ownership, the shareholders are the owners of the firm. The shareholders elect the directors of the corporation, who in turn appoint the firm’s management. This separation of ownership from control in the corporate form of organization is what causes agency problems to exist. Management may act in its own or someone else’s best interests, rather than those of the shareholders. If such events
Business risk refers to the chance a business's cash flows are not enough to cover its operating expenses like cost of goods sold, rent and wages. Unlike financial risk, business risk is independent of the amount of debt a business owes (Guzman & Media, 2015). Financial risk refers to the chance a business's cash flows are not enough to pay creditors and fulfill other financial responsibilities (Guzman & Media, 2015). Financial risk is the additional business risk concentrated on common stockholders when financial leverage is used and depends on the amount of debt and preferred stock financing (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2014).
NewMarket Corporation (NewMarket) is a holding and parent company of Afton Chemical Corporation (Afton), Ethyl Corporation (Ethyl), NewMarket Service Corporation (NewMarket Services), and NewMarket Development Corporation (NewMarket Development). Each of the corporations manages their own assets and liabilities. Afton encompasses the petroleum additives business, while Ethyl represents the sale of tetraethyl lead (TEL) in North America and certain petroleum additives manufacturing operations. NewMarket Development manages the property they own in Virginia. NewMarket Services provides various administrative services to NewMarket, Afton, Ethyl, and NewMarket Development. NewMarket Services departmental expenses and other expenses are billed to
The instructor may vary the emphasis on different issues by altering the study questions and by the choice of video clips. The case is well suited for courses and classes concerning corporate governance, valuation, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate social responsibility. The following objectives of the case allow students to:
has written a number of books on M&A in the last few years. The most recent—a copy of which I’m now holding up—is called Deals from Hell, and it’s just been Hell released by Wiley & Sons. All I will say about the book is don’t be misled by its title. As will become clear in a moment, Bob is a vigorous dissenter from the now conventional line that M&A is bad for shareholders. But before I ask Bob to start us off, let me briefly introduce the other panelists in this discussion: Gregg Jarrell came to the University of Rochester in 1977 after completing his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. Gregg did a series of pioneering studies in M&A starting in the late ’70s and continuing throughout the ’80s. And apart from a three-year stint as Chief Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the mid-’80s, he has been one of our star teachers at the Simon School. Clifford Smith is the Louise and Henry Epstein Professor of Finance at the Simon School. Cliff recently received the Robert I. Mehr award from the American Risk and Insurance Association, and he was also designated an FMA Fellow by the Financial Management Association—both of which are great honors for him and the Simon School. I also have to point out that, during his 31-year tenure at the school, Cliff has won an amazing 30 distinguished teaching awards, 20 for Executive Development programs and 10 from our MBA students. James Owen is
In 2002 the Hershey trust company board decided to sell school shares from Hershey stock. The board wanted to sell the 33% of Hershey shares at premium and reinvest the money in another company to make profit for the school. The board was responsible to oversees the investment and make sure the school was doing fine. Looking on this issue as financial personnel the board decision was better to sell stocks at premium and reinvest in another company.
The basic principal relating to the administration of the affairs of a company is that “the will of the majority is supreme”. The general rule is that the decisions of the majority shareholders in a company bind the minority. 1 In a world that recognizes ‘simple majority rules’, minority shareholders of companies are by default vulnerable to oppression,