preview

Frede Vs. Burnyeat: Does The Skeptic Have Beliefs?

Better Essays

Frede vs Burnyeat: Does the Skeptic Have Beliefs? In Michael Frede’s article, ‘The Sceptic’s Beliefs,’ Frede argues that contrary to popular interpretation Pyrrhonian skeptics do, in fact, have beliefs. However, other scholars such as Myles Burnyeat disagree with this notion that Pyrrhonian skeptics can have beliefs. In this paper I will argue that Frede’s view of The Outlines of Scepticism is the correct interpretation of Sextus. As well as explain and clear up the dispute between epistemic and non-epistemic appearances. First it is important to understand the type of belief we are talking about before we can truly understand Frede’s and Burnyeat’s dispute between epistemic and non-epistemic appearances. In The Outlines of Scepticism Sextus …show more content…

Michael Frede thinks that “no matter how ingenious he may be, the sceptic cannot avoid knowing many things” In order to live a functioning life it is impossible to not assent to some things. For instance, this can be seen through the example of Pyrrho. Pyrrho was said to be a man who took the skeptical view to an extreme and by doing so he restricted himself from living a functioning life. He attempted to live a life devoid of belief and ultimately without the help of his friends (who did have beliefs) he would have walked off a cliff or met his demise in some other ridiculous way. Diogenes Laetrius wrote about Pyrrho saying “in his life he followed [his skepticism]; he avoided nothing, took no precautions, but faced all risks… he left nothing to the guidance of the senses; but he was saved from harm by his friends who were always with him.” As Laetrius says, Pyrrho would not have been able to live a functioning life, whatsoever, if his friends were not always by his side. This leads to part of the reason why Frede thinks sceptics do, in fact, have beliefs. And that having a certain type of belief in order to live a functioning life does not necessarily go against Pyrrhonian …show more content…

Frede argues that when we assent to appearances it is a different type of belief than one we are used to Sextus talking about. The assent to an appearance is a non- dogmatic belief and Frede believes skeptics are allowed to have non- dogmatic beliefs. In fact, without these non-dogmatic beliefs all skeptics would have to live lives that resembled Pyrrho’s. The difference between epistemic and non- epistemic appearances can be seen in a passage Frede wrote. “I might, when I see an oar partially submerged in water, say ‘it appears bent to me,’ where ‘appears to me’ has the sense that I believe the oar is bent; if, however, someone explains to me that it only appears bent to me, I shall no longer think the oar is bent. Nonetheless, the oar still looks bent. And thus I can still say that the oar appears bent, but now I shall be using ‘appears’ non- epistemically.” If the oar really was bent then ‘appears’ would be epistemic. Burnyeat thinks the difference between epistemic and non- epistemic is the same distinction between how things seem and reality. Burnyeat also thinks that the skeptic can assent to how things seem but must suspend judgment about how things really are. Because the skeptic does not assent to reality, Burnyeat believes that the skeptic is not assenting to how something truly is and therefore has no beliefs. However, Frede thinks

Get Access