Involvement And The Effect On The Failure Of The Terrorist Attacks On September 11

The Intelligence Community has had successes and failures, many of which have made history. One of the most prominent failures in U.S history was the attacks on September 11, 2011. Now most people would start to read this essay and think they know everything about what happened that day because it has been so publicized. However, for me it was different. Yes, I was alive when it happened, but I was too young to understand. The September 11th attacks have been of particular interest to me due to the fact that they happened right in my backyard. One of them even occurred in the same state in which I live. For this reason I wanted to know why an event of this magnitude occured in the U.S. The safety of Americans has changed since then leaving many people affected. The collection and analysis of intelligence in our nation changed dramtically after the 9/11 attacks.

Paper 1: What are the capabilities and limitations of intelligence in supporting homeland security efforts?

The analysis is then given to consumers and policy makers, once it is checked by the analyst supervisor and peers. The analyst should also be ready to give a briefing on short notice. But both the analyst and the policy maker or consumer have to be aware of at all times, is that the intelligence field does not know everything. “On any given subject, the intelligence community faces what is in effect a field of rocks, and it lacks the resources to turn over every one to see what threats to national security may lurk underneath” (Pillar).

September 11, 2001 forever impacted America and gave a new challenge to our government that went far beyond any challenges that a natural disaster had presented in decades. The terrorist attacks were definitely a wake up call to being more prepared for natural disasters and reevaluating our intelligence agency jobs and communication levels. In chapter 2, one of the key points that Kettl discuss is connecting the dots. We can see that in the midst of 9/11, America focused on the nation’s intelligence services for answers. As the American people we wanted to know, who were the hijackers, where was security and most importantly, and who do we hold accountable? Furthermore, that the intelligence agencies failed to piece together information that already had about terrorism speculations. In chapter 1, Kettl talks about the warnings and signs that the government has before catastrophes (such as September 11, Hurricane

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were the direct result of the failure of US agencies, ranging from the White House to airport security, to recognize vulnerabilities present in the various symptoms. The reason why these vulnerabilities were not acknowledged and repaired is that these various agencies were trapped in a cognitive dissonance cycle of thinking. After the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a regional problem (9/11 Commission, 92). The majority of terrorist groups were either groups sponsored by governments or militants trying to create governments (i.e. Palestine Liberation Organization). As a result, the tactics used for fighting terrorism were centralized mostly in the Middle East and were restricted to

The 9/11 terror attacks is one of the historical and fatal events that changed the United States of America forever, especially in relation to terrorists and terrorism. While these concepts were on the minds of very few people in America's population before the attacks, the 9/11 incident made terrorism to become one of the major concerns for the whole nation. This is despite of the fact that they were carried out in New York City, Washington, and parts of Pennsylvania. Since it was a major concern, the terror attacks dominated all kinds of media and contributed to increased security measures for average Americans. Moreover, terrorism currently provides a major threat to global security that any time in American and global history (Dyson, 2001, p.3). As a result, it has become a fundamental aspect for law enforcement agencies and their initiatives, particularly with the rapid technological advancements.

Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).

The 9/11 attacks opened the avenue for a scrutiny of the performance and ability of the intelligence community to detect any threats to the safety of the United States. The media, politicians, reformists and other interested parties would not comprehend how such an attack would happen without the knowledge of the intelligence community. However, it is important to consider the fact that the attack was one of its kind and could not be approached with the resources and expertise used in other initiative such as the cold war. Therefore, the need to restructure the intelligence community arose from the view that it was still operating in the mindset and spirit of the cold war even in the modern era that had seen a revolutionary change of warfare

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were the direct result of the failure of US agencies, ranging from the White House to airport security, to recognize vulnerabilities present in the various symptoms. The reason why these vulnerabilities were not acknowledged and repaired is that these various agencies were trapped in a cognitive dissonance cycle of thinking. After the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a regional problem (9/11 Commission, 92). The majority of terrorist groups were either groups sponsored by governments or militants trying to create governments (i.e. Palestine Liberation Organization). As a result, the tactics used for fighting terrorism were centralized mostly in the Middle East and were restricted to

Subsequent to 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon which compelled the U.S. to imagine the unconceivable. That day things went really wrong, because that was the day that terrorist decided to make their presences know by attacking us. They evolved from using bombs to using airplanes to deliver as there attack weapon because it would cause lethal fatalities on U.S. soil. This was never done before and we were not prepared to handle such a massive attack. This paper will investigate what went wrong before and after 9/11, the effects of post 9/11, surveillance surge on state and local policing, what was the problem why the C.I.A. and the F.B. I. did not communicate with each other, analyze our current and past laws in regards to the dissemination of information between state, local authorities, and federal authorities, and to recommend changes or reforms to policies that are obsolete. We understand that local law enforcement and state agencies will bring specific advantages (there strength) from there organizations, and they will also bring their inherited weaknesses. Thereby, they will bring one important thing to the table which is how they collect local intelligence; as well as them being able to address some of their weaknesses. For example, lack of analytical capacity in order to fully use the data they collect. This paper builds and contributes to how things were before and after 9/11, and the types of changes that were made within law

We always had a communication issue between agencies, but when 9/11 happened it showed us just how much we needed to change how these organizations communicate, as well as change certain policies that would address these issues. Because of the lack of communication, and new requirement for terrorist attacks which can happen at any time or anywhere, this was a very harsh lesson to learn, at that pivotal time. The CIA, the FBI, and other agencies did not share all the chatter, from another terrorist or want to be terrorist. Therefore, this power point will address why this topic was chosen as an influential event, and the impact this event had on the ICS (Incident Command

The Testimony of Cofer Black, the Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center from 1999-2002, greatly affected my thinking about the domestic intelligence ‘failures’ which led to the inability to foresee or prevent the 9/11 attacks. His testimony, paired with both concurring and clashing views from the 9/11 Commission Report, gave a persuasive ‘defense’ of the intelligence community’s actions and capabilities before September 11, 2001. Three of Black 's ‘agreements’ were particularly influential towards my understanding. First, Black presented a strong argument that the inefficiency of counterterrorism had much to do with pre-9/11 domestic priorities, which left those involved with fighting terrorism, including those acts

It is practically impossible for a nation’s intelligence community to detect and prevent every attack on its soil. However, the American failure to uncover the 9/11 plot should be considered a massive failure considering the scope of the attack which involved careful planning, training many perpetrators, and a high profile target with many victims. Furthermore it can be demonstrated that there were many signals and opportunities to discover the plot that the intelligence machinery missed. “Hindsight is 20/20” and there needs to be an understanding of how easy it is to look back at how the intelligence gathered before the attacks should have signaled a serious threat, and thus provoked the unraveling of the 9/11 plot had the intelligence community

The terrorist attack of September 2001 was a tragedy that could have been prevented by the United States Intelligence professionals. The Islamic radicals such as Al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden had long declared their objectives to undermine the United States national security since the first World Trade Center Bombing on Feb 26, 1993. The 911 Commission report outlined the deficiencies of several government agencies, principally the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. The Commission criticized the intelligence community’s effort in anticipating and proactively engaging in counterterrorism to protect and defend the nation from terrorist threats.