Joint Force 2025: Term Paper

The subsequent sections will propose how smaller and better-combined joint forces maintain lethality, mobility, and survivability. In spite of some associated risks, force adjustment is an opportunity to form an aggregate joint force. Nevertheless, these contractions will not mirror equally among the services. The result will be a lean joint force that maintains the ability to defeat conventional and asymmetric threats in all domains. Discussed in this order, Air Force, Army, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and Navy general structure will revolve around the integration of skills and capabilities. Next, discussion of the four categories of risk involved in the transition to Joint Force 2020 include operational risk, force management

The security environment that is shaping the Joint Force 2025 (JF25) is incredibly complex and rapidly evolving. Challengers to security and stability include two aggressive competing powers (China and Russia), two nuclear capable regional hegemons (North Korea and Iran), and a persistent threat of terrorism to the homeland. The global commons are contested and access to the space and cyber domains are no longer guaranteed. Fiscal constraints limit the available means for the Joint Force (JF) to meet these challenges and therefore increases risk to accomplishing the national military objectives.

In present day, the U.S. nuclear weapons and DCA (dual capable aircraft), which is used to deliver the weapons, are currently deployed in five European countries (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey). In order to maintain the credibility of its assurance and deterrence, the U.S. should not withdraw its own DCA (dual capable aircraft) and its nuclear weapons from Europe. In the past years, Russia became significantly more aggressive politically and militarily. The annexation of Crimea and the “upgrades of its nuclear and conventional capabilities” are a few examples of Russian’s aggression. Sustaining the DCA and nuclear weapons is a visible demonstration of the U.S. commitment to the security of the transatlantic region and its allies.

Following over a decade of irregular war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is attempting to reset towards a conventional, regular type of warfare. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a U.S. military shift to the Pacific and the supremacy of capability against near peer nations rather than support irregular of and counterinsurgency operations. As the QDR points out the U.S. military must “be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace.” This is balanced against the reality that “our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged

The plan to align brigades with each global combatant command is a great strategy. The benefits of regional aligned forces are shown in improved operations, planning, and execution of missions. It also provides a greater partnership as the result of cultural proficiency and reduced cost of security operations in foreign countries.

Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has unceasingly threatened the United States and their interests during modern times in reference to the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) considerations and variables.

In addition, the space situational awareness is becoming more crucial to the U.S. government and the DoD. Current policies focus on utilizing coalition partners to assist in space situational awareness (Government U. S.,

The security environment today is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. Supporting these capabilities requires proper balancing of the Joint Force. This essay discusses the impending environment, key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required by

The overall business for the U.S. army is simply to fight and win the nations wars by using a full range of operational tactics. One domain which the Army relies upon is cyber. Without the ability to communicate across boarder and into dark areas of the world, the U.S. armed forces, to include the U.S. Army would be hard pressed when devising plans to win. However, to remain the superpower the world looks to during times of strife, organizations such as the Army must define the technological edge, and ensure the organization keeps upholds that standard. To fulfill the requirements associated with defining the edge, decision makers must remain aware of change. Unfortunately change happens, and requires a reevaluation to ensure the organization has not, or will not become stagnant. If events were to occur, the organization would no longer be able to define what it is to be on the edge of technology. Moreover, the organization could also easily find itself in a situation where it is hard pressed to devise the plans required to win.

Since the beginnings of our existence as a human race we have been exploring. We have sailed the globe and civilized wilderness frontiers. Now that we have completely explored the earth, we begin to look toward space. Exploring space is an enormous challenge that requires brilliant minds and leaps forward in technology. In order for space exploration to be successful we need it to be a priority. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long been a pioneer in the field of space exploration, but due to changing political attitude it is at risk to lose much of its funding. NASA should not have its funding reduced because: NASA develops the technology that benefits the public; their missions bring countries together; they are developing technology we will need in the future; and the advance to progress of the human race. The future of humanity will depend on the technological innovations and the international cooperation that NASA facilitates.

Today’s security environment is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. This essay discusses the key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required of the Joint Force, each member services and the inherent associated risks.

The problem the total Joint Force (JF) 2025 will face will be consistent emerging “gray zone” threats that include hybrid and near peer competitors trying to tip the balance in the global security environment. In addition, as the Department of Defense (DOD) learned from past wars while its resources reduce, the total JF 2025 must adapt and become more agile in countering these emerging threats. The DOD has provided the strategic and military guidance along with associated posturing statements for the complementary capabilities of strategic adaptability and agility that will enable the rebalancing of the total JF 2025, support future contingency operations, and mitigate risk.

This pertains to Phase 0 planning, and the conduct of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), which are “designed to ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing United States forces with peacetime and contingency access.”1 This is important as a more forward positioned force can support TSC exercises which continue to strengthen relationships with our allies, and continue to build on partner nations and their capability. This allows for a greater understanding on how global contingency operations will be conducted within a certain area of operation, and strengthen the command and control that will be needed. This will require the Marine Corps to tailor its forward presence to support, with an emphasis on security cooperation and crisis response of the SPMAGTF, and Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) command elements. The MEU can then mutually support TSC exercises under a MEB command element, with additional enablers from within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) from the forward postured forces. A prime example is the current integration of the Task Force 51/5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (TF 51/5) located in Bahrain, and TF 51/5 serving as the Combined Joint Task Force for exercise Eager Lion in Jordan, with 24 MEU supporting. The Naval integration allows for the integration of disparate assets under a single command, which focuses the command and control in a single unified effort.2 Because the Navy and Marine Corps fall under a single one star command, “TF 51/5 can

When a person thinks about the Arctic, they might picture polar bears or Santa Claus, but they will probably never image that it is a potential hot spot for future conflict between major powers. The Arctic Ocean is a region of the world with numerous conflicting border claims and a rapidly changing environment. Russia, Norway, Denmark(Greenland), Canada, and the United States all have claims to the Arctic. These nations (except the USA) have all submitted various claims to the UN’s Committee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Most of these claims are based on the Convention of the Law and Sea which says that a nation can control all of the resources in their continental shelf even if its past the 200 mile mark. The debate is about where does the continental shelf end, or where are each nations boundaries with each other along the continental shelf. Each of these nations has at least one border conflict with another. Russia, though, has been the most active in making these claims a reality. Russia’s proactivity in the Arctic has been from a desire to gain an advantage over the other nations (particularly NATO) in the Arctic from natural resources, shipping lanes and military.

Cyber-space and cyber-warfare are two terms that have varied definitions from between agencies and institutions. Since there are varying definitions of cyber-space it is important to accurately define the new digital domain where cyber-warfare will take place. A comprehensive definition of cyberspace explicated by Thomas Wingfield states,