Marine Amphibious Warfare During World War II

6a. With respect to the author’s conclusions (either specified or implied), I accept or agree with the following and why: His explanations of the struggle to keep the Marine Corps alive and the early development of amphibious doctrine make this book a great tool in understanding the modern Marine Corps.

This essay claims that the changes in the theatre of war are a reflection of the changes happening in all other areas of the world.

Although Allied troops encountered many Japanese kamikaze planes which destroyed some warships, the Allied Air Force successfully supported their troops on the ground. While the Sixth Army landed more troops on the beach, the I Corps protected them and advanced eastward, and the XIV Corps moved south toward Manila. Because of central Luzon’s geographical features—mostly open plains—the XIV Corps was able to quickly advance toward Manila. Around this time, another amphibious landing of the Eighth Army occurred to the south of Manila. From there, the 11th Airborne Division also advanced on Manila. While the XIV Corps was advancing southward, the I Corps switched to defending their left flank. Meanwhile, General Yamashita had his strongest forces deployed in north Luzon and around the Clark Air Base. However, the Japanese were disorganized because of lack of communications and were not prepared for many US attacks. On their southward journey, when the XIV Corps reached Clark Air Base, they battled for control until it was captured on January 29, which also gave the US more supplies found within the base. Following this, the XIV Corps pushed towards Manila and started the attack on January 31 from the north and south of the city. On February 4th the 11th Airborne Division advanced into the city, but met strong Japanese defences. They pushed through and finished capturing the defences on February 11th, and

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The prospect of amphibious invasion has historical been one of the most logistically difficult to coordinate military operations. This can be clearly seen in the case of the Penobscot Expedition of 1779, which is recognized as the worst defeat of the U.S. preceding the Attack on Pearl Harbor. However, not thirty years later, combined American land and naval elements launched a success overland assault and coordinated naval bombardment on the fortress of Derne, protecting the city of Tripoli, forcing its capitulation on 27 April 1805. The difference between these two attacks stems not from major advancements in technology or ease of the assault on Derne, but from the underlying organization and coordination of the assaults.

To be offensive in war requires you to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Because of how the mission was planned, the Marines were directly placed on offense. The amphibious operation was key to the success of the United States. By being flexible, and using original tactics such as combining artillery, naval gunfire and tank support was crucial to the successful offensive combat the US needed to maintain throughout the entire battle. Even though the Marines suffered a huge number of casualties, the soldier’s maintained a level of courage and devotion until they had completely captured the island from the

The Battle of Midway was a turning point in the Pacific War not only because the U.S. was advanced in their new tactical capabilities, but also because they had crushed a tested and undefeated Japanese Navy that was projected to win. The U.S. set a new standard for themselves by integrating aircraft carriers into its fleet and was able to strike at a moment’s notice from a much closer range than the land-based aircraft. The effective range of the fleet’s strike arm had grown so big that navies could now engage without ever sighting each other, just as they had in the Coral Sea. Every element involved in this battle was able to make it the most impactful naval battle in American

Amphibious operations are deeply rooted in The United States Marine Corps’s heritage and traditions. The Continental Marine Corps conducted its first amphibious assault against the British fort at New Providence, Bahamas early in 1776. The Marines, commanded by Captain Samuel Nicholas, surprised the British garrison when they landed on the beach under a covering naval bombardment in their first combined land and sea action. Marine

Operation Overlord, one of the largest marine attacks in history, was what led to the liberation of Nazi Germany. More commonly known as D-day, Operation Overlord was the codename for the Battle of Normandy(1). The battle took place on June 6, 1944 and was the 1,738th day of World War II(1,4). Normandy was split into 5 beaches, America would take Utah and Omaha beach and the British and Canadians would take Juno, Gold, and Sword. 156,000 American, British, and Canadian soldiers were part of the invasion force. The plan for D-day required elaborate planning and deception. What happened during D-Day helped lead to the allies liberated France in August and defeating the Germans the next spring(1).

June 6, 1944, marked the beginning of Operation Overlord, with capturing the coast of Normandy being the allies’ objective. Shortly after midnight, the allied began their invasion by parachuting thousands of paratroopers into Normandy to bring the battle behind the German coastal defenses. At around the same time, minesweepers began clearing channels for the invading fleet, which consisted of over 5,000 ships. The Germans, by contrast, had around 100 total ships in the area at the time, which heavily outnumber them. Similarly, the German air force also faced the same situation in the air as the Nazis could only mobilize roughly about 850 aircraft in comparison to 11,000 allied planes. The allied began commencing naval bombardment on the beaches

The 1944 Allied attempt to gain a foothold on Western continental Europe remains to this day the grandest military operation ever undertaken, according to Ambrose (1994, p.2). But for all the logistical planning, armaments, and manpower that went into Operation Overlord, the heart of the mission can be distilled down to small groups of infantrymen struggling up the slopes of five heavily fortified beaches. The deeds that transpired on those beaches- codenamed Gold, Juno, Sword, Omaha, and Utah - have been endlessly glorified in print and film. The names of the men who orchestrated the Allied invasion have been elevated into the great pantheon of human achievement. And the phrase “D-Day” has entered the collective lexicon to describe a moment

Hofmann writes about the pride of the Americans deployed in the Philippines in October 1941. Everyone was assured in the quality and number of American servicemen, their Filipino Soldiers, along with the new equipment arriving from the United States. Hofmann recalls the conversations over drinks where Army Air Corps pilots brag about the advantage of the P-40 Warhawk and the capability of the new B-17 bombers to guarantee the Japanese never make it past the edges of Luzon. The Navy was extremely poised that their ships, even although they are older than the Japanese, but were superior. Another Naval officer briefed the sailors that amplified patrols of Navy ships and aircraft would an ample warning of Japanese forces headed toward the Philippines.

Troops also used a torpedo to sink ships. Tanks had small-calliber guns which were very useful for bunker breaking attacks. Most soldiers were equipped with submachine guns. These submachine guns were very light so the soldiers had great mobility while carrying the weapon.

EF-21 describes as the Marine Corps serving as an “expeditionary force-in-readiness” that focuses on amphibious operations centered on a culture that “fast, austere, lethal”. The adage that “words have meaning” should be considered when we start talking about employing a lethal force that is built upon the idea that individual units will act in accordance with broad intent and limited support. Peace operations in particular present a unique set of challenges as civil and military considerations change throughout the operation and those considerations are necessarily accompanied by restrictive ROE and codes of conduct. In general this long term “police” type action is not well suited to a force dedicated to being “the right force at the right

The first source in this investigation, which will be evaluated in depth is Lieutenant Colonel Andrew T. Noblet’s Master’s thesis “Tarawa to Okinawa: The Evolution of Amphibious Operations in the Pacific during World War II”, written in 2010. The origin is valuable because Noblet attended Marine Corps Base (MCB), Quantico (formerly known as Amphibious Warfare School), which is renown for practicing and developing amphibious tactics, strategies and warfare. Noblet later served as Deputy Director for the Reserve Support Unit at MCB, further establishing his credibility of his understanding of amphibious warfare. In addition, the date of the report, 2010, further strengthens the source, as it indicates that Noblet benefitted from hindsight, was able to account for a wide