Student Id 1103033 Eu Law Assignment

The structure and formation of the EU executive has proved to be a major debate over the years. The major question which continues to arise is: Should the EU have a dual executive where policy making is divided amongst the Commission and the Council? Or should the EU have a single institution where either the Commission or the Council has a more dominant and superior leadership role? Simon Hix defines this dual executive model as ‘a separation of powers’ (Hix and Hoyland 2011). In order to understand whether this separation is good or bad we must outline the power each institution has and inevitably their role in the formation of policy-making in the European Executive. Over the course of this essay I shall discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a dual executive model on an EU level.

European Law is very complex law , within EU law there is various different treaties which are in place. Two most significant treaties which have importance to the legislative process are The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

The European Court of Justice – The court has a judge fro each member state that sits for a term of six years. The court adjucates on all legal issues and disputes involving community law and must ensure that community law in uniformly interpreted and effectively applied.

The principle of supremacy of European Union (EU) law has been established over the course of more than five decades. It is a principle that was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1964, and it has continued to have a rich history in the jurisprudence of the ECJ and national constitutional courts. As the ECJ and national courts attempt to define their respective realms of influence, a bright debate has sparked regarding constitutional pluralism. Moreover, the recent codification of primacy in the Constitutional Treaty has led to a new debate on the scope of the supremacy of EU law.

Historically the EEC treaty contained no provision dealing with the concept of supremacy of Community law over the national law of member states. In fact, treaties were generally silent as to the nature of the relationship between EU law and national law except for a general obligation contained in article 4 (3) TEU which states:-

Enforcing the European Union legal system is diverse and done on multiple platforms; through not only actions taken against member states for breach of their obligations, but also, for example, through the use of direct effect1. Article 267 TFEU; an organism devised to practice private enforcement of EU law before national courts, has been critical to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU law in member states. References for preliminary rulings occur when the national courts are presented with a question of EU law due to uncertainty of the provision. The national court will therefore ‘make a reference to the Court of Justice (COJ) to obtain a preliminary ruling on any point of EU law relevant to the proceedings’2. In

The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy are extremely important because they require national courts to apply European Union law over any conflicting provision of national law. This essay will first consider the doctrine of direct effect, its advantages and disadvantages and it will go on examining the doctrine of supremacy, how it can be assessed and its relation with the doctrine of direct effect. Finally, some conclusion will be drawn as to how the direct effect and supremacy of Union law provisions are related to each other and how can be really helpful for individuals and member states when looking at the big picture, even if in some situations they might be seen as inappropriate.

European Union Law challenges the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty. The European Union also has the doctrine of supremacy which means all member states must adhere to European Union laws as opposed to their own national laws. This may have restrained Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK upon its entry to the European Union in 1972. In order to comply with the European Court of Justice the UK Parliament enacted the European Communities Act 1972 and the Human Rights Act 1998.

The 'EU ' only has the powers that it 's gifted under the 'EU ' treaties. If you find judicial systems operating under a 'EU ' priority this is done so under our elected parliament 's instruction. A sovereign state has control. We have that control!

The 'EU ' only has the powers that it 's gifted under the 'EU ' treaties. If you find judicial systems operating under a 'EU ' priority this is done so under our elected parliament 's instruction. A sovereign state has control. We have that control!

This essay analyses the ways international investment tribunals have dealt with the alleged incompatibility of EU law and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The analysis is made through analogy as there is no case involving a direct conflict between EU law and the ECT. Instead, I will look at cases arising from the conflict between intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and EU law. BITs often offer similar standard of protection as those embodied in the ECT. First, in terms of jurisdiction and applicable law, whether the accession to the EU has impliedly terminated earlier intra-EU BITs and secondly, whether there is a substantive incompatibility between EU law and ECT obligations and how it should be resolved.

Nowadays, legislation of both Westminster and Brussels has become the main source of the law for the UK. Moreover, United Kingdom has its own law, which is called English legal system equally Brussels has a major role within the UK as it part of the predominant source for the UK. Therefore, this paper will firstly examine and give brief description of the legislative power. Then, it will define the legislative powers of both Westminster and Brussels and their roles. Consequently, it will explain the important roles and show how these roles are played by the English courts and the European courts of justice (ECJ). Also, it will show how Brussels enforce compliance with treaty provisions and explain how European Union citizens approach the European courts of justice.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ), first created by the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 is situated in Luxembourg. The court’s main objectives were the interpretation and the consistent and uniform application of the treaty across all Member States. With the exception of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the ECJ has gained influence through the different treaties over time. The ECJ unlike any other international justice system is able to cooperate directly with its citizens who are able to directly invoke a European provision before a European Court through ‘direct effect’. Further EU law has supremacy over the national laws in individual Member

ECJ held that the court second seised (Austrian court) must stay proceedings despite being designated in a jurisdiction agreement until the court first seised (Italian court) determined that the Gasser case was not within the jurisdiction of that court. Furthermore, it is not allowed to ignore Art 21 even when the court first seised lasted the proceedings much longer than needed. ECJ also accounted for the importance of stringent compliance lis pendens rule that the Regulation is established based on mutual trust in which Member States consent to trust other’s legal systems and judicial institutes .

When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was created in 1952 as a provision of the Treaty of Paris, no one could have imagined from such humble beginnings that the ECJ would become the institution that it is today. Today, the conflict between a semi-autonomous judiciary capable of conveying uniquely European rights on citizens able to be defended before a supranational court, and European governments, remains one of the clearest examples of the unintended consequences of an economic union that has over time evolved into something much more. As such, the question of why and under what circumstances European governments defer to ECJ judgements has never been more pertinent. In this paper, I will first provide a brief overview of two significant developments in the trajectory of the ECJ, before focusing on the case of France as an ideal example of how national legal contexts can at times conflict with EU law. Second, I will argue that the ECJ is keenly aware of its precarious position as an actor in the process of European integration. Since the 1960s, the court has occupied a contested space between those questioning the legitimacy of national law in light of the primacy of EU law, and those arguing that a democratically accountable EU requires an independent judiciary and supranationally shared set of rights and responsibilities. The supremacy of EU law to that of national law is an inherently delicate concept, challenged by both politicians and citizens alike.