Summary Of General Martin Dempsey's Vision For The Joint Information Environment

There are two directions for information and directives to drive strategic cyberspace decisions at NSWC PCD. The first is always direction sent through the Navy command chain by either direction from an Admiral and policy changes or through directives from N2/N6 at NAVNETWARCOM through the CIO/IA command chain. Either path often leaves little room for choosing an interpretation locally. However, either the upper management, Commanding Officer, Technical Director, and technical department heads will meet and issue a local direction or in some cases directives flow from N2/N6 to NAVSEA to The Warfare Center Headquarters to the Warfare Center CIO and/or IAM. In the case of the latter path, more input, discussion, and interpretation is available at the local level. In those cases the CIO will call a meeting of the IAM, IT Manager, IT Operations Manager, and other key advisors to discuss the requirements and provide options on the how to meet those goals within the strategic operation plan of the command. The CIO will then draft a local recommendation to be presented at the CO/TD forum for upper

My current duty station, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe & Africa, continues to afford me the ability to lead albeit with a minimal staff; a component command overseas as opposed to a communications company in the continental United States (CONUS) has fewer cyber technical specialists. This may seem like a deterrent to an in-depth training capability, it has in fact fueled my desire to ensure my young Marines are the next cyber technical experts this side of Apple or

The Department of Defense is one of the oldest executive departments of the executive branches in the United States of America and is in control of national security and the Armed Forces of the United States. More than 3 million employees embody the Department of Defense and control it’s day-to-day operations and is well funded with a budget of $680 billion thanks to a bill that passed 68-29 in 2010 . Under the Secretary of Defense there is a very powerful Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense, Teri Takai. Teri is responsible for developing strategic plans and to align with the department’s mission and the mission of the United States. The CIO of the Department of Defense interested me because of the decisions having to be made affect so many users. Every decision Teri makes has to be spot on and has to take in consideration, how it will hurt or benefit other departments or national security. The goal of the CIO is to unify the information management and to advance the technology vision of the department.

This is the greater context facing the U.S. Army’s 516th Signal Brigade based in Hawaii. The 516th Signal Brigade consists of 2,500 soldiers and federal employees responsible for the installation, operation, and defense of tactical and strategic information technology (IT) networks for the U.S. Army in the Pacific Theater (from Japan to Alaska). Every day the 516th Signal Brigade must defend against cyber-attacks, provide IT service support to many thousands of users, and remain prepared to deploy quickly its mobile communications teams in the event of conflict or a natural disaster. However, during my tenure within the brigade from 2013-2015, I discovered

I have a comprehensive understanding of the Department of Defense’s vision and direction and long-range plans and emerging technologies that can lead to proper programming and resource allocation. The Strategy of the DoD, DoN, and the USMC relies on the use of innovation and emerging technologies to maintain both a strategic and tactical advantage in the warfighting domain, and as a means of achieving efficiencies in the business domains. The DoD in general and the DoN specifically have in their vision statements and leadership direction that the services will use innovation both as a force multiplier and a means to achieve efficiencies and costs savings. While the various Services and Agencies within the DoD differ in some aspects, there are numerous similarities. They all have the vision and objectives to delivery information to the user to meet the Command and Control and IT needs, even in a contested environment. Generally, the goals within the Department are to consolidate and stabilize the infrastructure, unify communications, manage innovation, build and maintain a strategic workforce, consolidate datacenters leading to improve application portfolio access and management and lastly enhance network operations. I will point out here that I have been materially involved in all aspects of these

The issue at hand is the ability for the Army to balance the need to remain globally responsive while balancing the distinct possibility the United States will face a substantial

All these systems change as new technology advances into the way we do business. Every year, increasingly, military occupational specialties will encompass information technology to enhance performance, speed, and reliability for real-time situational awareness. The military is on the cutting edge in conceiving, testing, and adapting information

Military leaders have recognized the role of information as a key contributor to victory on the battlefield. The ability of the commander to quickly receive, analyze, and pass information is a critical element to the success of military operations. In order to understand how information affects military operations it is necessary to think in terms of three distinct domains; the physical domain consisting of the natural environment in which the senses are dominant, the information domain consisting of data, information systems, and documented knowledge, and the cognitive domain which consists of situational awareness, assessment and understanding. Technological innovation introduced over time has provided the ability to transition from one

Mr. Justin Landes worked with his team of Enterprise Management Systems (EMS) administrators through a successful Command Cyber Readiness Inspection (CCRI). Thanks to Mr. Landes’ superb work ethic, dedication, organizational skills, and technical abilities, he was able to take on the challenge of bringing up the overall compliance score of less than 50% to an exceptional score of 85.6%. This score ranked amongst the top 3% in the Army.

I agree that the Combatant Commander and Joint Forces Commander should become more familiar with the cyber domain and how it could impact all the other domains, but the issue arises on continuity of effort. As you mention, “multiple federal government agencies” have a role or responsibility in the cyber domain and in some cases they overlap, have gaps or are concurrently ongoing without coordination.

My first paper is due for my graduate studies and I have a few questions to ask in order to fulfill the requirements set forth by our instructor.

An argument outlining the aims of "Full Spectrum Operations" and its alignment with the demands of a 21st century reality. Considers the move from a hierarchical to lateral command and control structure. The benefits of more immediate feedback loops for organizational aims, as well as front line leaders and troops.

The general capabilities of joint force 2025 I believe necessary to rebalance the force based on the current strategic direction, and global security environment is the global surveillance and strike (GSS) network, increased naval and air investments and increased investment in cyber technology. The GSS system would allow the U.S. military to strike quickly and remain engaged for increased periods of time while additional forces are moved to the area of concern. Naval and air investments are critical. The Navy and Air Force allows us to project power to areas of the world far from our base of operations. Air power also enables us to provide support for ground forces and deterrence and denial of enemy forces. Cyber investments are critical because cyber technology will increasingly be the engine that runs our future military and allows us to attack adversary’s cyber networks and infrastructure.

In my capacity as the Director, Information Management and Systems for AMC, I served as the enterprise information operations manager worldwide (140 locations) directing over 3000 personnel programmatically and 120 (up to 200 depending on position) directly (serving as a third level supervisor). I accomplished the following: In my capacity as the Director of Information Management and Enterprise Operations, I oversaw a large personal staff and a program management staff that managed the commands geographically dispersed day-to-day enterprise IT operations. Serving as the program manager for several major IT functions throughout the command, I faced a variety of problems that included, but not limited to; a poor performing infrastructure, poor service support, lack of system engineering and planning, a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) and several poorly designed homegrown applications developed by the individual business units. While many of my problems were standard for a large command one of the larger issues that are typically missed was a strategic approach to managing information technology holistically across a command that had seven distinct mission sets along the associated funding. As with all Army commands this command was diverse and some of the subordinate commands existed before the parent command came into existence. This translated into disparate approaches in IT solutions. The subordinate commands had

In 2009 the DOD created the US Cyber command, a sub-unified command led by the Director of the NSA, this allows US Cyber Command to utilize both the experience and assets of the NSA. By this point in time both the Airforce and the Navy had already created their own respective cyber commands. Those commands were made subordinate to the US Cyber Command upon its creation, and the Army was made to create their own cyber command that would be subordinate as well. While this created a definitive organization tasked with defending the US in cyberspace this did not solve the problem of a lack of requirements and regulation, there were still no standards or set expectations of capabilities. This issue left the US wide open to attack, and exploitation by enemy nations or anyone else capable in the realm of cyberspace.