1) Why is Flagstar in financial distress? When possible, back your claims with data.
Signs of financial distress
• The company lost money almost every year since its leveraged buyout by Coniston Partners in 1989. The income generated was not sufficient to service the interest expenses of the company which stood at $2.62B in 1996. From Exhibit 1, we can say that interest coverage ratio computed as EBIT / Interest Expense was 1.31 in 1989 and has been decreasing over years and currently stands at 0.59. This raises a question of how the company can meet its interest payments without raising cash or selling assets.
• The company evolved through an elaborate series of mergers and divestitures, and financed its acquisitions through debt.
…show more content…
4) Evaluate DLJ’s analysis, highlighting at least three points that you judge contentious.
DLJ used comparable method of valuation and used lower side of EPITDA multiple, and that makes valuation undervalued. Following are three points which are contentious:
1. Used Lower side of EBITDA Multiples: Dillon report does not justify that why they should take lower side of multiples. Even though JP Morgan valuation proposed such low multiples, but failed to indicate how it arrived at this multiple value.
2. Used M&A comparables method which does not fit well in Flagstar’s case. Flagstar’s lawyer argues that their valuation is valid because it is verified with Mergers and Acquisition method, which does not seem right method for Flagstar case. Since company is going through financial distress, M&A method should not be used to verify the valuation.
3. Multiples Applied to 1997 operating Results: Since in 1997, company’s operating results do not reflect its true potential because of all the impending bankruptcy news, using 1997 results makes valuation undervalues.
5) Evaluate Jefferies’ analysis, highlighting at least three points that you judge contentious.
Jefferies used discounted cash flow method to value Flagstar and came up with higher valuation. This seems to be overvalues for following reasons.
1. WACC is not right method: When Debt to Value ratio is changing
The high EV multiples of SGMS indicates that its stock price is very likely to be overvalued, especially when considering its lower profitability and higher leverage, compared to its competitors.
Historical data on the indexes of closing prices (see Exhibit 14) attest that the current market trend is very different to the market trends for some of the benchmarks used (i.e. West Point Pepperall/Cluett, Peabody). In addition, it is difficult to determine the true nature and equatability between the proposed benchmarks and Interco for each company can differ in its cash flow and revenue growth, its riskiness, and its future expansion opportunities. In consequence finding comparable ratios becomes increasingly problematic and challenging. Thus, the issues that are specific to Interco limit the strength and validity of the valuation analysis. One must also note that comparable transaction analyses do not account for premiums or synergies gained in a transaction.
• Secondly, there is the definitional assumption. Analysts assume that their definition of EBIDTA is uniform with others. But in reality this is not true! In exhibit 2, Martin defined the multiple to be Implied Cable value + Non Cable Consolidated Assets/adjusted EBIDTA. A different definition may be used in another
The suggestions we are showing make the model more aggressive in how it determines the value of a firm, but we believe that would provide a more accurate representation of the firm’s value. The current valuation model is overly conservative, which is good news when it comes to making a buying decision.
2011 Valuation Edition Yearbook.” (Exhibit VIII). We would like further clarification and documentation surrounding this number, and would like to look into other sources that may estimate small stock premiums of this size to compare the appraiser's estimates.
In spite of a recent share price rally, DIS stock also appears undervalued considering its lower valuation compared to the industry average. Its stock is trading around 19 times to earnings and 4 times to book ratio, when the industry average is hovering around 21 and 4.4 times, respectively.
Despite insider buying, recent poor performance has kept the stock price at a very low level; an examination of valuation multiples and a DCF analysis imply a 50-70% upside.
Based our valuation, COLM is undervalued and this is consistent with the historic trend and analysis. COLM has consistently traded below its peer-group average. It has the potential to grow and outperform. The financial analysis is based on LT growth rate, recent acquisition activity, ROE decomposition, and the Cash Conversion Cycle.
Every assets have to be valued in order to take an investment decision, and their sources have to been understood as well. Various methods of valuation can be used, and a certain degree of uncertainty exists.A valuation is uncertain. A good valuation does not provide a precise estimate of value.Nevertheless, a valuation enables to get a large overview in order to take an investment decision.For that reason valuation is a strategic aspect in many areas of finance. In corporate finance, the firm’s value aims to be as high as possible and will have an effect on corporate decisions, including projects to develop and where to find funds, and on the dividend policy.
From the case exhibit 2, the company had a stellar performance from 1983 to 1987. As an industry leader in construction industry, their net annual sales increased significantly from 1.6B in 1983 to 2.9B in 1987 about 81% growth in 4 years. Their operating income before tax (EBIT) had a steady growth from 1983 except a dip in 1987 mainly due to changes in the overall industry primarily contributed by increased in cost. At the same time, the return on equity at end of
The debt to equity ratio is 2, the beta is 0.2 according to the FT (2015) which means its shares are 80% less risky in comparison to the entire market and the dividend payout ratio (DPS/EPS) for the company is
The passages show that Morgan Stanley fear value was $2 billion for the business operation. This value is 43% lower than our valuation of $3.48 billion for the deal. The passages and the published document are not clear why the fear value should be so low. This vague suggestion is more eccentric when we look the valuation made by Morgan Stanley. It had made a valuation using different methods such as comparable analysis, discount equity analysis, discount cash flow analysis, and sum-of-the-parts analysis, and different scenarios (Figure XXX). Based on the values that Morgan Stanley calculated, we calculated a weighted average value for it. Using the same weighted for each of the cases scenarios, and methods showed in the
1. Exhibit 1 and 2 report the income statements and excerpts from the notes to Marks and Spencer’s financial statements for the fiscal years ending between March 21, 2005 and March 31, 2009. Critically analyze M&S’s accounting choices. What choices may have helped the company to overstate its net profits between 2005 and 2009?
The valuation of a business is a critical element that depending on the accuracy of the valuation can be the difference between large positive returns or devastating losses for investors. The importance of valuation is why differing methods are always being debated and analyzed. The valuation of traditional companies with historical data and comparative industry examples can be a bit confusing for the average person but with practice they really are not overly complicated.
The literature review looks at the motives of (M&A) with previous companies. In addition to this, previous studies will be looked at to investigate the benefits of previous companies acquiring other companies to increase their market capital.