The Eu Law Making Process

It is also important to consider the effect that the principle of subsidiarity can have on the central European Parliament, as it is required to only carry out “those tasks which cannot be performed effectivity at a more immediate or local level” . This importance of decisions being taken as closely as possible to the citizen, can be monitored through constant checks being made to verify that the higher EU level is legitimately required. After members of the European Parliament were granted the power to approve or reject legislation in 1979 , it was then established in Article 5 of the Treaty of Lisbon that member states must also be given the ability to repeal an adoptive legislative act. This is particularly regarding one of shared areas, to certify “the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the union and to improve the coherence of its action” . There is also much concern that unless EU voters can “become more credible and legitimate in the eyes of the voter” , particular areas of the Union may begin to tangle.

The democratic deficit is a theory developed by scholars in order to illustrate that the European Union and its institutional bodies suffer from a lack of democracy (Wincott, 1998, p. 414). However, there are many definitions of the democratic deficit (Chryssochoou, 2000; Justice, 1996; Warleigh, 2003; Weiler, Haltern & Mayer, 1995) depending on the views and approaches of each scholar. Joseph Weiler's ‘standard version' of the democratic deficit is one of the most common definitions and it is a set of widely-used arguments by academics, scholars and the media (Weiler et al., 1995, cited by Follesdal & Hix, 2005, p. 4). It consists of five claims that explain why the EU can be called undemocratic and they are the following: a) there is an

Interest groups maintain the capacity to speak for citizens who have these other main priorities ensuring that their opinions and interest are represented within the European Union. This utility goes a long way towards reducing the democratic deficit of the Union. Although the public may not have time or energy to direct their interests to their representatives, so long as they know that there is a group or organization representing their interests in Brussels, they may be more inclined to view the Union as democratic.

The structure and formation of the EU executive has proved to be a major debate over the years. The major question which continues to arise is: Should the EU have a dual executive where policy making is divided amongst the Commission and the Council? Or should the EU have a single institution where either the Commission or the Council has a more dominant and superior leadership role? Simon Hix defines this dual executive model as ‘a separation of powers’ (Hix and Hoyland 2011). In order to understand whether this separation is good or bad we must outline the power each institution has and inevitably their role in the formation of policy-making in the European Executive. Over the course of this essay I shall discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a dual executive model on an EU level.

European Law is very complex law , within EU law there is various different treaties which are in place. Two most significant treaties which have importance to the legislative process are The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

Analysts have also criticised the undemocratic nature of the legislation, because interest groups dominate policy-making in the EU excluding more regular channels of democratic governance. The very complexity of the legislative procedures also means that it is virtually impossible for even experts to understand them. In addition much of the decision making takes place behind closed doors. They have also targeted European elections as decentralised, apathetic affairs.

Further, the Commission’s institutional structure is a factor putting great weight on perceptions of the democratic deficit since it lacks democratic credentials yet largely dominates EU law-making in spite of the presence of the EP as its democratic face. Commissioners are not elected, directly nor indirectly, as is with most sovereign executives. Follesdal and Hix however argue that the exercise of these executive powers requires contestation of political leadership and policy. They also suggest that direct elections by citizens or national parliaments should be allowed for the contestation of the Commission President who holds the most powerful EU executive position, so as to increase democratic input. Contrary to this position is that of Moravcsik, who discounts the idea of elections as a possible remedy and rejects the notion of

In this assignment I will be assessing the democratic accountability of the European Union. I will begin by briefly describing the institutions, their functions, compositions and discuss how they work as check and balance system to ensure democratic accountability further to look on to how laws are made and what they are In order to establish whether or not the EU is in fact answerable to its citizens.

The European Union (EU) is fundamentally democratic and is evident through its institutions, however, the current democratic electoral structure is of great concern. The EU is a new type of political system, often referred to as a sui generis, implying its uniqueness as there exists and a non comparable political body. The EU can neither regarded as a ‘state’ nor as an ‘international institution’ as it combines supranational as well as intergovernmental characteristics (Hix, 1999, p7). In this regard it has developed its own understandings of what democracy is. It is evident that the development of and spread of democracy is a central concept and foundation to all politics within the EU, and remains focuses on makings its governing

Article 110 TFEU prohibits Member States from discriminating against other Members-States by placing, direct or indirectly, a tax on

The CJEU is the highest court in the EU. It is comprised of one judge from each member state and is supported by eight Advocate Generals whose role it is to provide an impartial and public opinion on the case brought before the CJEU. The primary function of the CJEU is to ensure that the interpretation and application of the EU law established by treaties is observed (Treaty of Rome: 1958). This is a necessity as the homogenous responsibility of the EU needs to be maintained as to insure community relationships between member states. The GC is a branch

The paper concentrates on the current condition of the popularity based deficiency in the European Union after the institutional changes that have been presented by the Lisbon Treaty. The key issue that is analysed is whether the methodology of democratization and the changes gave by the Lisbon Treaty have reacted to the popularity based requests of the subjects and if this procedure has made more proficient and closer Union to the citizens.The just deficiency has been distinguished in various ways, however most acknowledged idea is the standard variant of the equitable shortfall. As per this idea, the primary issue of the EU is the way that there is a movement of political control from the law based parliamentary frameworks of government at national level to the official focused frameworks of government at the European level.

An Analysis of the Powers of the European Parliament History of the European Parliament: On the 18th April 1951 the Ministers representing France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg signed in Paris a treaty which established the European Coal and Steel Community, the ECSC was born. The most important feature of the ECSC was its supranational character, it was a supranational organization. It was aptly described as a 'quasi federation in an important economic sector.[1] The Community was endowed with five organs; 1. An executive, called the High Authority 2.

In order to look at whether the institutional changes from the Lisbon Treaty have been able to reduce the democratic pressure and if after these changes does the European Union still lack democratic accountability. We shall look at all the main insinuations and discuss the changes that were brought in and how these may have or haven’t contributed to make the union free form its democratic pressure.

The EU has gone through different Treaties in order to achieve democratic legitimacy. This includes the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001), the “unsuccessful” Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), and the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). The last two treaties, stirred open debates around Europe, with critics claiming that the treaties will channel a way for an unelected European super-state, while at the same time, defenders argued that it