World War II, Vietnam And The Iraq War

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

During the Vietnam War, United States involvement was for personal reasons and fear of communism. Neither the United States or the Soviet Union should have been involved. The War was just used as a cover up for the actual silent, passive aggressive war between the United States and the Soviet. The Vietnam war was started by the North “Viet Cong” and their desire to unify Vietnam under communist rule. The South was against communism, making tensions grow until eventually, a war broke out on November 1, 1955. Five years later in the 1960s, the war was escalated with the involvement of foreign countries. While the North was supported by its communist allies such as China and the Soviet Union. The South was supported by the United States of America. The Americans wanted to halt or prolong the spread of communism. The “domino theory” compelled the U.S. to get involved as soon as possible because if not, the rest of Asia would fall to communism like “dominoes”. The U.S. involvement only started with Eisenhower administration when Vietnam split in half. This action of the United States was only for their own well being and their main goal was not for the good of Vietnam. During this time period the Vietnamese had just united and established the state of Vietnam. The war ended up lasting 9 years with long periods of bitter guerrilla warfare in the rugged jungles of Vietnam which would eventually result in the victory of the North and longed unification of Vietnam

The Vietnam War and Iraq wars have many more similarities then the common American would think. Both were fighting gorillas in a foreign land in a way that the soldiers were never trained or prepared for, against a foe that despise America as a whole. However I believe the biggest difference is the American publics view and attitude toward each of the two wars. As well as the attitude of the soldiers in each of the wars in 2001 after the September 11 attacks we had people like Pat Tillman give up a career in the NFL and volunteer for the Army. The uprising of pride and numbers plumped to the start of that war. That is greatly different then the attitude during Vietnam when the US government had to institute a draft to help the numbers in soldiers. While people in the streets chanted “hell no we wont go”

“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.” - Sir Winston Churchill. Throughout history, men have fought battles to protect and serve for their country. Some men become injured at war and others don 't get to live on to tell their stories. We are all thankful of those who are able to live on and tell their stories to the common people about their experiences. Two intriguing Wars are the American Civil War and the Vietnam War. They both deal with the long challenging fights between the North and the South regions within each country. The Civil War and the Vietnam War were never declared wars but still managed to divide nations and families. During these wars, many people died defending their land. Two very different war veterans are truly remarkable for the duties they have performed. Robert Edward Lee; the general in chief of the Civil war, and Gary James Walker; a veteran of the Vietnam War have interesting stories from their active military days.

In his article, “Why Has American Stopped Winning Wars?” Dominic Tierney discusses some of the topics in his recent book, “The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts.” The book, unlike the article, provides recommendations for how America can adapt to a new era of warfare. Having said that, Tierney’s article published in the The Atlantic, provides no such recommendations nor does it provide adequate reasoning to support his argument, rather he leaves the reader emotionally charged and unable to make an informed judgement concerning the validity of his claims. Specifically, the author commits the fallacies of appealing to emotion, followed by the presentation of glittering generalizations and a false dichotomy. Therefore, the purpose here is to analyze his argument as outlined in the article, “Why Has American Stopped Winning Wars?”

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

During times of conflict, leaders of the executive branch tend to be able to use their military, diplomatic, and executive powers more freely and face a lesser degree of opposition than is the norm. Similarly, Congress is noticeably more productive and works well with the president and their co-legislators during such circumstances. This phenomenon was observed in the early stages of the War on Terror following the events of September 11, 2001 as well as during the Vietnam War. In this research paper several factors will be considered in comparing the powers of the presidency and Congressional powers during the two wars named, ranging from the presidents during each, to public opinion, as well as the change in each of these aspects over time. One must also consider the differences in the methods of warfare used. In the conclusion, these factors together will tell us which branch of government reigned supreme during each of the two wars discussed.

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

Today’s strategic environment, whether government or corporate, is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) often times characterized by “wicked problems” or unsolvable problems. Compiled during the early 19th century, Clausewitz’s manuscript “On War” arguably posited the same conclusion in relation to the strategic level of war. He described war as uncertain, unpredictable, and marked by chance. The more the scale moved from the tactical realm to the strategic realm, the more complex war became due to the aforementioned variables. Society today must contend with the impacts of globalization, which has led to significant changes in economic, social, and cultural norms. These changes have resulted in compressed timelines and reduced decision space. With so much information available, the risk of information overload has presented challenges to how individuals approach problem solving. As a result, society has become over reliant on what Guy Claxton defines as deliberate mode (d-mode), “a way of knowing that relies on reason and logic.” (Claxton, p2)

This book argues that time is the primary dimension in modern war and explores the paradoxes of warfare's temporal characteristics. Leonhard introduces a bold new theory that focuses on time as the critical component that controls all other aspects of war. Well-grounded in history, Leonhard's work is certain to take its place as a classic theory of war according to James R. McDonough, who wrote the

Rolihlahla Mandela was born in July 18th of 1918 in a village called Mvezo, situated in South Africa. He attended a Christian school where he was given the name Nelson as it was a custom to give Christian names to school children (Moloko, 2014). He was from a very poor family and always wanted to help his people out of such poverty. His parents raised him telling stories of their ancestors’ accomplishments and he begun to dream of doing the same, which indeed he did.

War analytical failures are always attributed to lack of sufficient intelligence information about the opponents, failure to predict possible long term consequences, having misleading information, poor leadership and overreliance on weapons without knowing their weakness. In contrast, however, military disaster can befall some territories, irrespective well informed their generals are, because of weakness in their abilities. Super powerful countries may also face the same problem because their leaders may misperceive on coming warnings and threats or make poor calculations in the way they respond to possible catastrophic dangers1.

Modern warfare is warfare using the concepts, methods, and military technology that have come into use during and after World War II and the Korean War.[citation needed] The concepts and methods have assumed more complex forms of the 19th- and early-20th-century antecedents, largely due to the widespread use of highly advanced information technology, and combatants must modernize constantly to preserve their battle worthiness.[1] Although total war was thought to be the form of international conflicts from the experience of the French Revolutionary Wars to World War II, the term no longer describes warfare in which a belligerent use all of its resources to destroy the enemy 's organized ability to engage in war. The practice of total war which had been in use for over a century, as a form of war policy, has been changed dramatically with greater awareness of tactical, operational, and strategic battle information.

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US

While “The Art of War” was written by Sun Tzu during the 6th century B.C., long before the colonization of the Americas, the onslaught of the Crusades, and before the Persian Wars of around 490 B.C., it remains relevant to this day. There is also strong evidence that the work inspired Napoleon and was used in the planning of Operation Desert Storm. “The Art of War” has withstood the sands of time due to its simplistic approach, and its applicability to non-military strategies. “The Art of War“, interpreted by Gerald, A. Michaelson, as well as other authors, use Sun Tzu’s timeless strategies and apply them to the modern day corporate world.