1. In the signalling model of education, separating equilibris in which educationacts as a signal of ability would break down if the costs of acquiring educationare equal for individuals with different abilities. Is this true or false? Explainyour answer2. The utility function of a consumer over two goods x and y is given byu(x, y)20 In x + 2yThe price of y is 1. Let p denote the price of x. The consumer has an income ofM> 10. The consumer's price elasticity of demand for x has a lower absolutevalue compared to the income elasticity of demand for y. Is this true or false?Explain by calculating both elasticities.3. A society consists of 3 identical individuals who derive utility from a publicgood. The public good can be provided at a constant marginal cost of 2. Letx, denote the level of public good provision by i, where i 1,2,3. Let X-x1 + x2 + x3 be the total provision. The net benefit enjoyed by individual i fromproviding x, units of the public good is given byU(x,x)= 4 In X - 2x,where i=1,2. Is the total provision X under individual optimisation higheror lower than the socially optimal level of provision Xº? Explain the intuitionfor your result.4. If the price of a factor of production rises, a profit maximising firm might usemore of that factor. Is this true or false? Explain your answer by drawing com-parison for consumer choice for a Giffen good.5. Consider an economy with two goods, A and B. Suppose the price of goodA is p and let the price of good B be 1. There is a large number of identicalconsumers. The indifference curves of consumers have the usual shape withdiminishing marginal rate of substitution between the two goods. Suppose thegovernment must raise a tax revenue of R, and can do this either by imposing aper-unit tax of t on good A, or by imposing a lump-sum tax 7 on each consumer.Which policy would the consumers prefer? Explain your reasoning carefully,using any appropriate diagram, and explain the intuition behind your result.

“Since you have posted multiple questions, we will provide the solution only to the first question…

1. In the signalling model of education, separating equilibria in which education acts as a signal of ability would break down if the costs of acquiring education are equal for individuals with different abilities. Is this true or false? Explain your answer

1. In the signalling model of education, separating equilibria in which education acts as a signal of ability would break down if the costs of acquiring education are equal for individuals with different abilities. Is this true or false? Explain your answer

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter3: Preferences And Utility

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3.9P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

he Calculus of Utility Maximization and Expenditure Minimization -End of Appendix Problem uppose that there are two goods, X and Y. The price of X is $2 per unit, and the price of Y is $1 per unit. There are two onsumers, A and B. The utility functions for the consumers are UA(X,Y)= X05.05 UB(X,Y)= X0.8y0.2 Consumer A has an income of $100, and Consumer B has an income of $300. Using Lagrangians, solve for the optimal bundles of goods X and Y for both consumers A and B. a. The optimal bundle for consumer A is X = 25 and Y* = 50 - b. The optimal bundle for consumer B is X = 120 and Y* = 60
1. A standard model of choice under risk is Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in which preferences over lotteries that pay monetary prizes (x₁, x2, ..., xs) with probabilities (P1, P2, ..., Ps) with Eps = 1 are represented by the function L S (a) What does it mean to say that a function represents the consumer's prefer- ences? Σpsu(xs) Choice 1 8=1 (b) State and briefly comment on the axioms required for the EUT representation. (c) Consider the following experiment of decision making under risk in which sub- jects are asked which lottery they prefer in each of the following two choices: Lottery B 0 with prob. 0.01 10 with prob. 0.89 50 with prob. 0.10 Lottery D Choice 2 Lottery A 0 with prob. 0 10 with prob. 1 50 with prob. 0 Lottery C 0 with prob. 0.90 10 with prob. 0 50 with prob. 0.10 Suppose that the modal responses are Lottery A in Choice 1 and Lottery D in Choice 2. Assume that utility of zero is equal to zero and illustrate why it is not possible to reconcile these experimental…
. Answer all parts (a) (c) of this question. (a) Consider an agent whose preferences over any couple (x1, x2), where 2₁ ER+ and x2 € R+, e.g., apples and oranges, is such that she prefers the bundle that is closest to having the same number of apples and oranges. Write a utility function u: R² → R+ which represent these preferences. A politician remarks "Our recent increases in the wage rates of teachers has been a total suc- cess! The shortage of teachers has been reduced drastically. Another, similar wage increase should eliminate this shortage entirely" (b) Explain and illustrate in a diagram what is meant by "income effects" and "substitution effects" of a wage rate change. (c) Explain and illustrate how you would model the labour supply decision of a potential teacher. Do you agree that the wage increase will increase the labour supply in this case? Carefully outline the assumptions underlying your argument.
please only do: if you can teach explain each partc: what does it mean? can you show graphs: show WARP : If the consumer’s wealth is high enough that both bundles can buy with both prices then WARP violates If the consumer may not be spending all of her wealth, are her choices consistent withthe Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (or is it impossible to determine)?: If the consumer’s wealth is high enough that both bundles are aordable atboth prices then WARP violates. why? Therefore, it is notpossible to know
Consider the market for a single network good and suppose thatconsumers differ in their valuation of both the stand-alone and thenetwork benefits (it can indeed be argued that it is more plausiblethat a user who has a higher value for the stand-alone component of atechnology also assigns more importance to the size of its network.) Tocapture this idea, write the consumer’s utility function for joining thenetwork as U(θ) = θ(a + νne), where a is the stand-alone benefit, ν > 0measures the network effect, neis the expected number of users joiningthe network, and is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.a. What happens if p > a + νne? (Hint: Identify all consumer who buythe good for at price p and a given expected network size ne).b. What is the consumer’s willingness to pay for the nth unit of thegood when ne units are expected to be sold? Is the demand downwardsloping? Does the demand increase with the expected network size?c. Express the fulfilled-expectations demand curve…
fonsumer's demand xy for two different and the consumer's in come is $72. different Consumer's demand xy for chosen to maximize two the శ్రిందికి goods are x² lefility function The per respectively unit of , and the Consumer's in come is $7 x and y are $3and $4. 22,2 © telrite out the fagrangean for the Constrained maximization problem © Find the utility maximizing demands for both goods and he Larange multiplier, 2 o What is the change in consumer's ufility if income Changes from $72 to $75
what is satiation point? And how it is helpful in deriving indifference curve?
Suppose an indinidual has the following utility finction Urey)-2+2" writh a strictly ineveaseng morrginal rate of substitntion. and income of 3 The price of y is $4 CPpi ) The intial price of x is $lcre=) and then increases to 3 px=3). Find the chonge in the quantidy consumed of X.IHow much of the chonge is the income effect? How much by the Substitution effect? Evplan in Econ terms erplainedl by
If Utility=.5lnX+3Z+10+4VW then Marginal utility from X is...... and the Mu of Z is...... Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. a b с 10; 3 3,4 5/X; 3 d 2/VW; 3
a. A consumer is willing to trade 3 units of x for 1 unitof y when she has 6 units of x and 5 units of y. She isalso willing to trade in 6 units of x for 2 units of y whenshe has 12 units of x and 3 units of y. She is indifferentbetween bundle (6, 5) and bundle (12, 3). What is theutility function for goods x and y? Hint: What is theshape of the indifference curve?b. A consumer is willing to trade 4 units of x for 1 unitof y when she is consuming bundle (8, 1). She is alsowilling to trade in 1 unit of x for 2 units of y when sheis consuming bundle (4, 4). She is indifferent betweenthese two bundles. Assuming that the utility function isCobb–Douglas of the form U (x, y) = xα y β, where α andβ are positive constants, what is the utility function forthis consumer?c. Was there a redundancy of information in part (b)? Ifyes, how much is the minimum amount of informationrequired in that question to derive the utility function?
Generally speaking the demand for a good will be more inelastic O if the good is very specific and narrowly defined. O the greater the time period being considered. O if the good is a luxury. O if the good makes up a small part of an individual's budget. 21 ttv MacBook Pro F8 F9 F7 D00 F4 F6 F5 F3
QUESTION 6 Which of the following was insight regarding optimal pricing that we gleaned from behavioral economics? O Make costs lump sum (integrate the costs into one cost) and separate allof the benefits of a purchase (separate the gains from an exchange). O Consumers always act rationally in their consumption decisions. O Expectations about products' prices don't matter for consumer behavior - all that matter's is the price they actually face, O Default choices for consumers don't matter for their behavior. QUESTION 7 Which of the following are the conditions for a firm to be able to profitably engage in bundlhpg?. O There is variation in consumers' willingness and abilities to pay for the goods, and consumers' valuations of the goods are positively correlated. O Consumers must like the bundled goods relatively equally. Consumers' preferences across the goods are relatively consistent with each other. O There is variation in consumers' willingness and abilities to pay for the goods,…