2.28. Consider the following sequence of events in the U.S. market for strawberries during the years 1998-2000: • 1998: Uneventful. The market price was $5 per bushel, and 4 million bushels were sold. • 1999: There was a scare over the possibility of contaminated strawberries from Michigan. The market price was $4.50 per bushel, and 2.5 million bushels were sold. • 2000: By the beginning of the year, the scare over contaminated strawberries ended when the media reported that the initial reports about the contami- nation were a hoax. A series of floods in the Midwest, however, destroyed significant portions of the strawberry fields in Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri. The market price was $8 per bushel, and 3.5 million bushels were sold.

2.28. Consider the following sequence of events in the U.S. market for strawberries during the years 1998-2000: • 1998: Uneventful. The market price was $5 per bushel, and 4 million bushels were sold. • 1999: There was a scare over the possibility of contaminated strawberries from Michigan. The market price was $4.50 per bushel, and 2.5 million bushels were sold. • 2000: By the beginning of the year, the scare over contaminated strawberries ended when the media reported that the initial reports about the contami- nation were a hoax. A series of floods in the Midwest, however, destroyed significant portions of the strawberry fields in Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri. The market price was $8 per bushel, and 3.5 million bushels were sold.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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