Consider the following static Bayesian game: 1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2, each game being equally likely. 2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Row player does not. 3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooses either L or R. 4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature. Column Column
Consider the following static Bayesian game: 1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2, each game being equally likely. 2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Row player does not. 3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooses either L or R. 4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature. Column Column
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.11P
Related questions
Question
![7
Consider the following static Bayesian game:
1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2,
each game being equally likely.
T
2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Row
player does not.
B
3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooses
either L or R.
4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature.
Column
L
R
T 1,1 0, 0
B 0,0 0,0
Game 1, Pr(A) = 1/2
Row
a) True or false? The static Bayesian game defined above has asymmetric information.
b) How many types does the Row player have? How many types does the Column
player have?
c) A strategy in a static (simultaneous) Bayesian game describes an action for
each
that a player could be
d) Fill in the blanks in the normal form representation of the Bayesian game defined
above
LL
0.5, 0.5
Column
L
R
T 0,0
0,0
B 0,0 2, 2
Game 2, Pr(B) = 1/2
0.5, 0.5
Row
1,1
RL
RR
0,0
J
e) What components define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a static game of
asymmetric information? Select all from the list below. i. strategies, ii. Beliefs about
the opponents' types, iii. Types iiii. Payoffs
f) Select all the strategy profiles that correspond to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this
game. i. (T, LL), ii. (T, RR), iii. (B, LR), iiii. (B, RR)](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F6bbd78e4-7c8b-48c2-af98-2b069286f0ae%2F401dc28b-1036-44df-a975-2f45632bdce1%2Fd04fom8_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:7
Consider the following static Bayesian game:
1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2,
each game being equally likely.
T
2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Row
player does not.
B
3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooses
either L or R.
4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature.
Column
L
R
T 1,1 0, 0
B 0,0 0,0
Game 1, Pr(A) = 1/2
Row
a) True or false? The static Bayesian game defined above has asymmetric information.
b) How many types does the Row player have? How many types does the Column
player have?
c) A strategy in a static (simultaneous) Bayesian game describes an action for
each
that a player could be
d) Fill in the blanks in the normal form representation of the Bayesian game defined
above
LL
0.5, 0.5
Column
L
R
T 0,0
0,0
B 0,0 2, 2
Game 2, Pr(B) = 1/2
0.5, 0.5
Row
1,1
RL
RR
0,0
J
e) What components define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a static game of
asymmetric information? Select all from the list below. i. strategies, ii. Beliefs about
the opponents' types, iii. Types iiii. Payoffs
f) Select all the strategy profiles that correspond to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this
game. i. (T, LL), ii. (T, RR), iii. (B, LR), iiii. (B, RR)
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