Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: Consider two firms competing in quantities, with total costs given by C1(q1) = αq1 and C2(q2) = q2, with α ∈ [1, 2]. Market demand is p = 2 − Q where Q = q1 + q2. Compute the equilibrium prices, quantities, profits, consumers surplus and total welfare as a function of parameter α.
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Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: Consider two firms competing in quantities, with total costs given by C1(q1) = αq1 and C2(q2) = q2, with α ∈ [1, 2]. Market demand is p = 2 − Q where Q = q1 + q2. Compute the
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- Gamma and Zeta are the only two widget manufacturers in the world. Each firm has a cost function given by: C(q) = 10+20q + q^2, where q is number of widgets produced. The market demand for widgets is represented by the inverse demand equation: P = 200 - 2Q where Q = q1 + q2 is total output. Suppose that each firm maximizes its profits taking its rival's output as given (i.e. the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists). a) What will be the equilibrium quantity selected by each firm? What is the market price? What is the profit level for each firm? Equilibrium quantity for each firm__ price__ profit__ b) It occurs to the managers of Gamma and Zeta that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms were to collude in a symmetric equilibrium, what would be the profit-maximizing choice of output for each firm? What is the industry price? What is the profit for each firm in this case? Equilibrium quantity for each firm__ price__ profit__ c) What minimum discount factor is required…Suppose a market is served by two firms (a duopoly). The market demand function given by P = 1200 - Q_{1} - Q_{2} where Q_{1} is the output produced by firm and Q_{2} is the output produced by firm 2 . Firm cost of production is given by the function C(Q_{t}) = 120Q_{t} and firm 2's cost of production is given by the function C(Q_{2}) = 120Q_{2} The average cost of firm 1 is given by A*C_{1} = 120 and the average cost of firm 2 is given by A*C_{2} = 120 Marginal profit function for firm 1: Delta pi 1 Delta Q 1 equiv1080-2Q 1 -Q 2; (d*pi_{2})/(Delta*Q_{2}) = 1080 - Q_{1} - 2Q_{2} Marginal profit function for firm 2: What will be the equilibrium profit levels earned by the Stackelberg leader firm and the Stackelberg follower firm?Suppose Firm X is a dominant firm in a market where the market demand is Q = 1200 -2p. Once Firm X sets its price, those small competitors set their prices a little lower so that they can always sell up to their capacity. Assume the small firms’ combined capacity is 100 units. Further assume Firm X’s marginal cost is 50. Answer the following questions. Let Q^D be the quantity produced by the dominant firm. Write down the residual demand function faced by Firm X. (Hint: Think about how Q and Q^D are related.) Find Firm X’s profit-maximizing price.