First Welfare Theorem: Suppose we have an endowment economy with two consumers i = 1, 2. Let e (1,1) be the endowment for both consumers. Let preferences be given by = U¹(x¹, y¹; x²) = (x¹y¹)¹/2 + 7x² and U²(x², y²; y¹) : (x²y²) ¹/² + 7y¹. := = When maximimizing utilty each consumer takes the others choices as given. Show that p*= (1,1) is a competitive equilibrium where each consumer demands her own endowment. Find a feasible allocation that is a Pareto improvement. Why does the first welfare theorem not apply?

First Welfare Theorem: Suppose we have an endowment economy with two consumers i = 1, 2. Let e (1,1) be the endowment for both consumers. Let preferences be given by = U¹(x¹, y¹; x²) = (x¹y¹)¹/2 + 7x² and U²(x², y²; y¹) : (x²y²) ¹/² + 7y¹. := = When maximimizing utilty each consumer takes the others choices as given. Show that p*= (1,1) is a competitive equilibrium where each consumer demands her own endowment. Find a feasible allocation that is a Pareto improvement. Why does the first welfare theorem not apply?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter4: Utility Maximization And Choice

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4.11P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

III. First Welfare Theorem: Suppose we have an endowment economy with two consumers i = 1,2. Let e' = (1,1) be the endowment for both consumers. Let preferences be given by U'(x', y'; x²) := (x'y')'/² + 7x² and U²(x², y²; y') := (x²y²)/2 + 7y'. When maximimizing utilty each consumer takes the others choices as given. Show that p* = (1, 1) is a competitive equilibrium where each consumer demands her own endowment. Find a feasible allocation that is a Pareto improvement. Why does the first welfare theorem not apply?
I need help with this homework problem. Suppose there are two consumers, A and B. The utility functions of each consumer are given by: UA(X,Y) = (X^1/2)*(Y^1/2) UB(X,Y) = X + Y The initial endowments are: A: X = 8; Y = 3 B: X = 4; Y = 5 What is the marginal rate of substitution for consumer A at the initial allocation? What is the marginal rate of substitution for consumer B at the initial allocation? Is the initial allocation Pareto Efficient?
Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 agents. The Örst agent has the utilityfunction, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2, and the other one has u (y1; y2) = 2 ln y1 + ln y2.The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (50; 100). Suppose there is asocial planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem b) Calculate the first-best outcome (i.e., the social plannerís solution).
We have 2 goods and 2 agents. Agent 1 has preferences u' (x, x3) = 2æx} while agent 2 has preferences u?(xỉ, x3) = min [x}, x] . Endowments are el (2, 3) and e? = (4, 3). a) Draw the Edgeworth box, including the endowment point and the indif- ference curves crossing it. b) Find a Pareto improvement over the endowments. c) Find a core allocation
John and Belle consume only two goods, x and y. They have strictly convex preferences and no kinks in their indifference curves. At the initial endowment point, the ratio of John's marginal utility of x to his marginal utility of y is J and the ratio of Belle's marginal utility of x to her marginal utility of y is B, where J B. b. C < J. c. C = J. d. C = B. e. J
Suppose that David and his friend Wilson derive utility from consuming two types of snacks: onion rings (9₁) and chips (9₂). The utility function for each individual is U (9₁, 92) = 9192. Their indifference curves for these two goods are assumed to have the usual (convex) shape. Suppose David has an initial endowment of 35 onion rings and 10 chips, and Wilson's initial endowment consists of 5 onion rings and 20 chips. (1) Draw an Edgeworth box and show the initial allocation of goods, to be labelled e. Indicate the initial quantities of each person's goods on the four axes.
9. Consider an Edgeworth box economy with two consumers, whose utility func- tions and endowments are e' = (5,5) 2 = (5,5) In the following, use the normalization p2 = 1. (a) Find the competitive equilibrium price. (b) State the first fundamental theorem of welfare and verify that it holds in this economy. (e) Consider the allocation ã = (x',) = (2,3), (8, 7). Show whether this allo- cation can supported as an equilibrium with transfers. (d) State the second fundamental theorem of welfare, and briefly discuss whether the result in part (c) conform with or violate this theorem.
Throughout this problem set, we will look at exchange economies with two goods and two agents. Let X = R², let u denote agent i's utility, and let wie X denote agent i's endowment. 1. Suppose u¹(x¹) = min{ri, 2} and wi = (4,8) for both agents i. (a) Argue that every Pareto optimal allocation has r≥r for both agents i. (b) Argue that every allocation z with r≥r for both agents i is Pareto optimal. (c) Draw an Edgeworth box, with a picture depicting every Pareto-optimal allocation. In this picture, also draw the endowment allocation, and draw each agent's indifference curve through the endowment. (d) Argue that, in any competitive equilibrium, the price of good 2 must be zero. (e) Find all competitive equilibria.
2. Consider an economy with two agents and two commodities. Consumers' preferences are represented by the following utility functions u₁(x,x) = (x²) ¹ (x²) ½ u₂(x², x²) = x² + x². Consumers' initial endowments are e² = (6,4). Note: You can normalize the price of one good to 1 at any point when solving this question. e¹ = (10,2) (a) Draw the Edgeworth box that represents this economy. Clearly indicate the size of the box (i.e. the maximal feasible amounts of good 1 and good 2). Show the location of the initial endowment and draw the indifference curve of each consumer that passes through the initial endowment.
Suppose there are two consumers, A and B. There are two goods, X and Y. There is a TOTAL of 8 units of X and a TOTAL of 8 units of Y. The consumers' utility functions are given by: UA(X,Y) = 2X + Y UB(X,Y) = X*Y2 Which of the following allocations is Pareto Efficient? None of the other answers are Pareto Efficient. Consumer A gets 3 units of X and 8 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 5 units of X and O units of Y. Consumer A gets 4 units of X and 4 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 4 units of X and 4 units of Y. Consumer A gets 1 units of X and 4 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 7 units of X and 4 units of Y. Consumer A gets 8 units of X and 8 units of Y, and Consumer B gets 0 units of X and O units of Y.
Please answer every part. 4. Consider an economy consisting of two individuals, Ann and Bob, and two goods, scotch and wine. Aun has 5 bottles of scoteh and 2 bottles of wine as her endowment, while Bob has 3 bottles of each. Suppose their preferences are described by the following utility functions uA(s, w) = sw and up(s, w) = s'u. Assume also that the prices of goods scotch and wine are represented by P,= 1 (scotch is the mumeraire), and P>0. a. Sketch the Edgeworth box of the economy with Ann at the lower left corner and Bob at the upper right corner; scotch on the horizontal axis, and wine on the vertical axis. Indicate the endowment point e in the box. b. Write the budget lines for Ann and Bob. e. Solve Ann's utility maximization problem. Expross Ann's optimal consumption bundle in terms of P. d. Solve Bob's utility maximization problem. Express Bob's optimal consumption bundle in terms of P. e. Define competitive equilibrium. Compute and plot the CE for this problem.
Suppose X = R k + for some k ≥ 2, and we define x = (x1 , …, xk ) ≥ = (y1 , …, yk ) if x ≥ y; that is, if for each i = 1, …, k, xi ≥ yi . (This is known as the Pareto ordering on R k + ; it plays an important role in the context of social choice theory in Chapter 8.) (a) Show that ≥ is transitive but not complete. (b) Characterize ≥ Is asymmetric? Is≥ Negatively transitive? Prove your assertions. (c) Characterize ~ defined from ≥ in the usual fashion; that is, x ~ y if x ≥ y and y x. Is ~ reflexive? Symmetric? Transitive? Prove your assertions.