Gozilla Inc. can generate 100 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Gozilla Inc., associated with emission reduction, is known MC=20+0.5Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Gozilla: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 40 units. Gozilla Inc. will clean up regulation is units of pollutant under the emission standard. The total control cost for Gozilla Inc. in this command-and-control Hint: Type integers.

Gozilla Inc. can generate 100 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Gozilla Inc., associated with emission reduction, is known MC=20+0.5Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Gozilla: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 40 units. Gozilla Inc. will clean up regulation is units of pollutant under the emission standard. The total control cost for Gozilla Inc. in this command-and-control Hint: Type integers.

Microeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617406

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter17: Market Failure: Externalities, Public Goods, And Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13QP: Economists sometimes shock noneconomists by stating that they do not favor the complete elimination...

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Economists sometimes shock noneconomists by stating that they do not favor the complete elimination of pollution. Explain the rationale for this position.
A toy factory Avengers can generate 50 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Avengers, associated with emission reduction, is known MC=10+Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Avengers: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 20 units. Avengers will clean up units of pollutant under the emission standard. The total control cost for Avengers in this command-and-control regulation is Hint: Type integers.
A polluting firm’s marginal abatement cost is MACi = 50 – 0.25ei . If a regulator imposes a per-unit emissions tax of t = 10, what level of emissions does the firm choose under the tax? A polluting firm’s marginal abatement cost is MACi = 50 – 0.25ei . If a regulator imposes a per-unit emissions tax of t = 10, how many units did the firm abate relative to the unregulated environment?
Gozilla Inc. can generate 100 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Gozilla Inc., associated with emission reduction, is known MC=20+0.5Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Gozilla: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 40 units. The level of reduction in the emission standard could be accomplished through an emission charge (quantity tax or penalty fee on emission). An emission charge of per emission unit would generate the target amount of reduction. Total (tax) revenue the regulator will collect as emission charges would be Hint: Type integers. Do not use thousands separators.
There are two towns, A and B, each with a plant emitting pollution. The emission from plant Ais uniformly distributed across both town A and B. The emissions from plant B are local to town B. Despite the difference in affected area, the marginal benefit to either town of abating one unit of pollution from either source is the same, MB(Qi) = 17 − Qi per person, where Qi is total emissions abated from town i’s air. The marginal cost of abatement at plants A and B are MCA(qA) = 200qA and MCB(qB) = 100qB, respectively. If town A has 300 citizens and town B has 200, what is the efficient tax to set at each plant?
A toy factory Avengers can generate 50 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Avengers, associated with emission reduction, is known MC=10+Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Avengers: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 20 units. The level of reduction in the emission standard could be accomplished through an emission charge (quantity tax or penalty fee per emission unit would generate the target amount of reduction. on emission). An emission charge of Total (tax) revenue the regulator will collect as emission charges would be . Hint: Type integers.
Plants A and B emit 12 tons and 6 tons of carbon dioxide (CO2), respectively. MAC(marginal abatement costs) for a = 12 - Ea, MACb=12-2Eb MD(marginal damage) = 1/3*E (E indicates CO2 emission) Suppose that the emission trading system is introduced and the right to emit 7 tons is given to power plant A and the right to emit 5 tons is given to power plant B. In order for emission permits to be traded, the price of one unit of emission permits must be at least a certain amount (minimum price) and conversely, how much must be less than a maximum (maximum price), that is, explain the fluctuation range of the emission permit price.
Plants A and B emit 12 tons and 6 tons of carbon dioxide (CO2), respectively. MAC(marginal abatement costs) for a = 12 - Ea, MACb=12-2Eb MD(marginal damage) = 1/3*E (E indicates CO2 emission) Suppose that the emission trading system is introduced and the right to emit 7 tons is given to power plant A and the right to emit 5 tons is given to power plant B. At this time, explain how the price of CO2 credits is determined and how much each power plant buys or sells.
Suppose that Penn Products and Teller Industries are both emitting 30 metric tons of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) into the atmosphere. Regulators wish to reduce emissions to 40 metric tons overall, and plan to achieve this with a system of tradable permits. Penn’s marginal abatement costs are given by MACP = 5eP, where eP is the number of metric tons of emissions that Penn is cutting. Thus, the cost of cleaning up the first metric ton is $5, the second ton costs $10 to clean up, and so on. Teller’s marginal abatement costs are given by MACT = 7.5eT, where eT is the number of metric tons of emissions that Teller cuts. a. The lowest-cost way to reduce emissions is found when both firms’ marginal abatement costs are equalized. Equate Penn’s and Teller’s marginal abatement costs, and solve for eP in terms of eT. For each metric ton that Teller cuts, how many tons should Penn cut? b. Because 20 metric tons are to be cut, we know that eP + eT = 20. Use your…
QUESTION 9 A toy factory Avengers can generate 50 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Ávengers, associated with emission reduction, is known MC=10+Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Avengers: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 20 units. Avengers will clean up units of pollutant under the emission standard. The total control cost for Avengers in this command-and-control regulation is . Hint: Type integers.
Consider an industry with two firms that emit a uniformly mixed air pollutant (e.g., carbon dioxide). The marginal abatement cost functions for Firm 1 and Firm 2 are: MAC1 = 100 - e1 MAC2 = 100 - 4e2 Aggregate emissions for the industry are denoted as E = e1 + e2. 1. In an unregulated environment how many units of emissions does each firm emit? Firm 1’s unregulated level of emissions ____________ Firm 2’s unregulated level of emissions ____________ Total unregulated level of emissions ______________ Suppose a regulator has a goal of reducing the total level of emissions from the amount from the amount you answered in [1] to 25 units. The regulator would like to achieve the goal of 25 units of total emissions in a cost-effective way. To do so it issues 25 permits, 10 are given to Firm 1 and 15 are given to Firm 2. A firm can only emit a unit of pollution if they have a permit for that unit, otherwise they must abate. After the permits are allocated,…
Suppose there are only two polluting firms, called A and B, with the following marginal abatement costs: MACA=160 2- e and MACB=100-es, where e represents firm A's emissions in tons and ea represents firm B's emissions in tons. Suppose the government wishes to ensure that the two firms together emit 60 tons of the pollutant and uses a Tradable Emission Permit (TEP) policy. Assume that each TEP allows its holder to emit 1 ton, and that the market for permits is perfectly competitive. a. Suppose the government initially distributes the total number of TEPs it issues equally between the two firms. The permits are distributed free of charge. Once trade in permits takes place, what will be the equilibrium in the market for TEPS (i.e. which firm will buy how many TEPs from the other, and at what price)? b. Briefly describe three problems of setting up a TEP market.