Suppose, if ill, that Fred’s demand for health services is summarized by the demand curve Q = 50 − 2P , where P is the price of services. How many services does he buy at a price of $20? Suppose that Fred’s probability of illness is 0.25. What is the actuarially fair price of health insurance for Fred with a zero coinsurance rate? If the insurance company pays Fred’s entire loss, will the insurance company offer him insurance at the actuarially fair rate? Why?

Suppose, if ill, that Fred’s demand for health services is summarized by the demand curve Q = 50 − 2P , where P is the price of services. How many services does he buy at a price of $20? Suppose that Fred’s probability of illness is 0.25. What is the actuarially fair price of health insurance for Fred with a zero coinsurance rate? If the insurance company pays Fred’s entire loss, will the insurance company offer him insurance at the actuarially fair rate? Why?

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter12: Medicare

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4QAP

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

For a person who previously had no insurance and received an insurance plan paying for 80 percent of all types of medical care, what increase in use would you expect for hospital care, dental care, and physician services, on average?
Here is what occurs in the following scenario: Bill has an income of $50,000 and has a probability of remaining healthy of 70%. If he is not healthy, Bill has the following projected medical costs that would be paid 100% by insurance: medications = $400, medical office visits = $1,600. What is the actuarially fair health insurance premium Bill should pay? a. $120 b. $480 c. $600 d. $1,400 e. $15,000
Jenny believes that the unwillingness to buy insurance by young healthy people creates a moral hazard problem for health insurance companies. Diego disagrees, and believes that their unwillingness to buy health insurance creates an adverse selection problem. Who is right? Explain.
1. An individual has a health insurance plan with a deductible of $1200 and a coinsurance rate of 50%. Their demand curve is Q=20-(P/10), and the equilibrium market price of medical care is $100 per unit. What quantity of medical care would the individual choose to consume? 2. Suppose that consumers are all risk neutral and so they do not purchase health insurance. The equilibrium price of a doctor visit is $30, the supply of doctor visits is perfectly elastic, and the aggregate demand for doctor visits is given by Q=200-5*P. Calculate the effect that universal perfect health insurance (that is, coinsurance rate=0) would have on social welfare, measured as the sum of consumer surplus plus producer surplus. 3. Consider a version of the Akerlof model in which neither buyers nor sellers observe car quality (though somehow – please suspend your disbelief – both buyers and sellers enjoy higher utility from higher quality cars). For this question, please assume that both buyers…
Health Care Demand An individual's demand for physician office visits in a given year is given by, Q = 11-0.045P, where Q is the number of office visits and P is the out-of-pocket price paid by the individual for each visit. Assume the market price of an office visit is $180. Use this information to answer the questions below. Questions: 1. Without insurance, how many office visits will the individual make in one year? NOTE: Enter a formula to calculate the number of visits, rounding your answer to the nearest whole number. 2. Suppose the individual has insurance and pays only a $40 copayment for each visit. How many office visits will the individual make in one year? NOTE: Again, enter a formula, rounding your answer to the nearest whole number. 3. What is the moral hazard and deadweight loss (DWL) associated with having insurance? NOTE: Enter formulas in the respective boxes below. Moral Hazard: DWL: 4. Based on the Nyman model, suppose the value the individual places on each visit…
Draw a graph and an argument about how increases in health due to one medical innovation can lead to improvements in health that are not directly affected by that innovation. Does it matter the demographic properties of those individuals whose health is improved by the initial innovation?
A noted insurance authority has said, “Because the financing of long-term care is inconsistent with insurance principles, it is a problem that does not lend itself to solution through insurance.” In what ways is the financing of long-term care inconsistent with insurance principles? What, in your opinion, is the solution to the problem of financing long-term care?
Suppose that a study finds that the price elasticity of demand for MRI's is 0.3 (in absolute value). If the price of care were to ___ by 3%, we would expect the quantity of preventative care consumed to fall by ____%. Suppose that a study finds that the price elasticity of demand for MRI's is 0.3 (in absolute value). If the price of care were to ___ by 3%, we would expect the quantity of preventative care consumed to fall by ____%. a. fall; 0.3% b. rise; 0.9% c. rise; 0.3% d. fall; 0.9%
Suppose consumers consume and gain utility from two types of goods and services – (1) health care and (2) all other goods & services. Using this information, derive the demand curve for health care.
Describe Grossman's Improvement Model of Health. How does Grossman reconcile health as both something in demand and something produced by individuals?
Based on Friedman and savage utility of income what factors affect demand for health insurance?
Suppose that there are two countries, Beta and Gamma. Suppose further that everyone in country Beta is on Insurance B and everyone in country Gamma is on Insurance G. Suppose further that both governments use government-set price controls. In 2005, country Beta decided to change the reimbursement rate for pharmaceuticals, but country Gamma did not make this change. You, a researcher. want to study the effect of offering coverage for this drug had an impact on health expenditures. You have average health expenditures for State Beta and Gamma prior to 2005 and post-2005. Using the information in the table below, a quick difference-in-difference calculation suggests covering this drug health expenditures by approximately. Time Periods Pre-2005 Post-2005 $1000 $1400 $1500 $1700 State State Beta State Gamma decreased: $400 increased; $200 decreased: $200 increased; $400