Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $16 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of q, = 100 - 2p, + 1p2, where q, is Firm 1's output, p, is Firm 1's price, and p, is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is q, = 100 - 2p, + 1p,. Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium. In equilibrium, p, equals $ and p2 equals $. (Enter numeric responses using integers.)

Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $16 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of q, = 100 - 2p, + 1p2, where q, is Firm 1's output, p, is Firm 1's price, and p, is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is q, = 100 - 2p, + 1p,. Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium. In equilibrium, p, equals $ and p2 equals $. (Enter numeric responses using integers.)

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)

9th Edition

ISBN:9781305260948

Author:Irvin B. Tucker

Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ

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