The government has recently introduced a marketable permit program for major polluters where one permit gives permission to pollute one unit. When the program is introduced, Firm A emits 400 units of pollutant and so is granted 400 permits. After one year, firms are issued 25% fewer pollution permits. If Firm A reduces its pollutants from 400 units to 240 units, how many permits does it sell after one year?

The government has recently introduced a marketable permit program for major polluters where one permit gives permission to pollute one unit. When the program is introduced, Firm A emits 400 units of pollutant and so is granted 400 permits. After one year, firms are issued 25% fewer pollution permits. If Firm A reduces its pollutants from 400 units to 240 units, how many permits does it sell after one year?

Microeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617406

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter17: Market Failure: Externalities, Public Goods, And Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 14QP

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The government has recently introduced a marketable permit program for major polluters where one permit gives permission to pollute one unit. When the program is introduced, Firm A emits 400 units of pollutant and so is granted 400 permits. After one year, firms are issued 25% fewer pollution permits. If Firm A reduces its pollutants from 400 units to 260 units, how many permits does it sell after one year?
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Chapter 10. 6. Achieving lower pollution
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The primary source of air pollution in the small town of Smokey, Nevada is a nearby steel mill. The local environmental agency has decided that the mill needs to reduce its emissions because the town's population is located directly downwind from it. Currently the agency is considering three different approaches to reducing pollution from the mill: a technology standard, an emission standard and an emission tax. Why might the owner of the mill prefer an emission standard to a technology standard that would produce the same level of emissions? a Because with emission standards the polluter is more flexible in selecting the technology that will minimize her abatement cost Ob. Because polluters usually try to stick to their existing technology O C. Because it has been proven to be easier to implement O d. Because polluters, as all producers are suspicious about new technologies
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There are three firms, A;B; and C that produce electricity. The first two firms have the same per-megawatt cost of production equal to $2, while firm C has a per-megawatt cost of $1. The firms differ, however, in their pollution. Firms A, B, and C produce respectively 1, 2, and 3 cubic feet of carbon monoxide per megawatt produced. A cubic foot of carbon monoxide pollutes the environment, and has a social cost of $2.5. The demand for electricity is represented by the inverse demand function P (Mw) =100 - Mw, where Mw represents the megawatts consumed by the public. Suppose firms are not held accountable for the pollution they produce. What is the competitive equilibrium price and quantity in the market for electricity? (remember that in a competitive market the price will be driven down to marginal cost (since firms in a competitive market earn zero economic profit). How much pollution is there at the competitive equilibrium and what is the social cost of this pollution?