The Se ond welrare neore n states that: a) A Walrasian equilibrium will be Pareto-inefficient, unless an “invisible hand" intervenes forcing consumers to choose a particular consumption bundle. b) A Walrasian Pareto-efficient equilibrium can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium. c) Budget constraints do not have to be always binding. d) A competitive equilibrium would be inconsistent with the concept of Walrasian equilibrium.

The Se ond welrare neore n states that: a) A Walrasian equilibrium will be Pareto-inefficient, unless an “invisible hand" intervenes forcing consumers to choose a particular consumption bundle. b) A Walrasian Pareto-efficient equilibrium can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium. c) Budget constraints do not have to be always binding. d) A competitive equilibrium would be inconsistent with the concept of Walrasian equilibrium.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter3: Preferences And Utility

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3.15P

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