You are given the market demand function Q=2200-1000p, and that each duopoly firm's marginal cost is $0.07 per unit, which implies the cost function: C(qi) = 0.07gi, assuming no fixed costs for i = 1, 2. The Cournot equilibrium quantities are q₁ = and 92 = (enter your responses as whole numbers).

You are given the market demand function Q=2200-1000p, and that each duopoly firm's marginal cost is $0.07 per unit, which implies the cost function: C(qi) = 0.07gi, assuming no fixed costs for i = 1, 2. The Cournot equilibrium quantities are q₁ = and 92 = (enter your responses as whole numbers).

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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