Unconventional warfare

Our first challenge to understanding Unconventional Warfare (UW) is there is no national policy or joint doctrine. This lack of appetite for incorporating UW into national strategy stems from two reasons. First, UW does not fit into the time constraints our key leaders have to work within. POTUS, Congress, members of the JCS, and our military commanders are not willing to invest in a campaign that exceeds their tenure. To do so would be career suicide. UW campaigns need about 18 - 24 months to achieve

The challenges of fully understanding Unconventional Warfare fall into two categories. First, the socioeconomic factors that drive a society are incredibly complicated, much more so than any military campaign, conventional or otherwise, is prepared to address. Second, self-imposed restrictions within our military, government and society have hampered attempts at sincere UW campaigns. In COL(R) Maxwell’s article, he suggests that there is a lack of understanding due to a dearth of intellectual

Unconventional Warfare (UW) use as a strategic option is undersold due to a lack of understanding. The lack of understanding cause further political constraints and leads to interagency bickering. Military leaders need to do better at articulating the merits of UW as a viable and strategic option. The lack of understanding UW stems from two parts. First, military leaders lack the understanding and practical application. Second, the lack of understanding leads to an inability to articulate the

The requirement and future of Army Special Forces (SF) will be determined by our ability to fully comprehend Unconventional Warfare (UW), and capability to sell our ability as UW experts to senior leaders and policy makers. After 14 years of combat operations, we have lost focus and become complacent in our original and most important primary mission of Unconventional Warfare. I would speculate the majority of SF qualified Soldiers cannot even state the definition of UW; much less articulate the

Reading Colonel Maxwell’s article, I started to think of the United States (U.S.) Unconventional Warfare (UW) history. If you look at our nation’s history prior to the 1900s, I believe the policy makers may have understood UW better, but more importantly, they did not have to deal with the modern day constraints of employing UW today. The issue today is not do we understand UW, as much as the employment of UW in the world we live in today. We live in the age of I have to have it all now, and of

Special Forces (SF) trains and educates for Unconventional Warfare (UW) because it is our core mission.  SF was created to execute UW.  It is our duty and obligation to train and educate ourselves and others on the subject of UW. As stated by, Robert M. Gates in 1992, “Unconventional Warfare… …remains uniquely Special Forces'. It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces soldier. Its training is both the keystone and standard

nail on the head with stating, America may not be interested in Unconventional Warfare (UW), but UW is being practiced around the world by those who are interested in it. The misunderstanding is likely due to the ambiguity of it all and not understanding the phases or how it should be employed. During this discussion, I will touch on four points in the article that I believe contribute to the misunderstanding. Unconventional Warfare isn’t understood, we employ it incorrectly, we train for it incorrectly

Mr. Dimayo I agree that Unconventional Warfare (UW) activities support other Special Operations Core Activities. You did mentioned Military Information Support Operations (MISO) during the American Civil War accomplished by guerrilla fighters operating behind enemy lines spreading disinformation to the enemy about troop strength and dispositions, disrupted Federal supply and communication lines, and distracted contingents of troops. I find this interesting and I do wander what other Special Operation

The lessons he passed on are still studied today by the United States Army Rangers, and every Ranger must memorize his Standing Orders. The tactics he used are now what the modern public and historians consider “American style fighting” or Indian warfare. Stephen Brumwell’s book White Devil A True Story of War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colonial America is not just a

Kautilya’s Theories on War for the Twenty-First Century Intrigue, assassination, spies, and prostitutes make for captivating reading in Kautilya’s Arthishastra. One could easily dismiss this extensive composition as amusing literature from ancient times, seemingly relevant today only in fiction or action-adventure movies. Kautilya, an ancient Indian military theorist and advisor to Chandragupta Maurya, is known as an extreme realist who by comparison makes Machiavelli appear tame due to the brutality