Britain's Decision Making Toward Nazi Germany

If Britain and France had abandoned their policy of appeasement and retaliated against Hitler's aggression war could have been averted. Appeasement was deeply embedded into British foreign policy, even to the the extent were they would not honor their military commitments to France under the Treaty of Locarno, that if Germany were to remilitarise the Rhineland, Britain would offer them support. So, when Hitler ordered armed cars to enter the Rhineland in March 1936, France failed to retaliate. This was the ideal time to have halted Hitler as Allan Bullock quotes Hitler saying “If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs”, because Germany was still militarily weak and war would have lasted six weeks rather than six years. However, the appeasers were determined to stop any violence, that they failed to see, according to Keith Eubank, had they “retaliated against the remilitarisation with force, the German military units would have withdrawn and perhaps Hitler would have been overthrown; the drift to war would have been halted and World War II averted”.

They let Germany do as it pleased to a certain extent in hopes that Germany would stop after they were satisfied. Although though the effects on Europe from World War 1 were devastating, France and Britain had rearmed enough to have beaten Germany if they were at war again. This is revealed when George F. Kennan, a historian and American diplomat claims that, “We know today that is was unnecessary … because the Czech defenses were very strong… and because the German generals, conscious of Germany’s relative weakness at the moment…” (Document 7)This proves that Europe had the potential to stop Germany and Hitler and also preventing World War 2. But because of the appeasement policy, Britain and France didn’t do anything and let Germany invade and take land. This allowed Hitler to attempt to take over most of Europe, ultimately causing world war

One of the most controversial documents of World War 2 was the appeasement signed on September 30, 1938 in Munich, Germany. The document known as the Munich Pact gave Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland to Adolf Hitler in hopes he would not seek additional territory. Before the appeasement was signed, Nazi Germany had previously taken multiple aggressive actions. In 1937, it had attacked a small city in Spain and in 1938 (before the appeasement was signed) it had invaded Austria. The Prime Minister of Britain began negotiations with Hitler in pursuit of achieving another war, which resulted in appeasement. This appeasement encouraged Hitler’s aggression as he gained confidence to attack and attempt to gain more territory. Ultimately, this was the wrong policy for England to pursue in 1938. The Munich Pact, as it was known, was unnecessary, gave Germany time to rearm, and 7f.

Appeasement was arguably the only realistic option for British policy towards Germany between 1936 and 1938 when considering the fact that appeasement permitted Britain to rearm, thus preparing her more effectively for war, whilst also giving her the moral high ground. Nevertheless, for some “appeasement has become a dirty word, synonymous with weakness and defeatism in the face of naked aggression” since Britain’s policy of appeasement succumbed to Nazi aggression and failed to actually prevent war. Subsequently many historians argue that alternatives including a ‘Grand Alliance’ and military intervention in the Rhineland (1936) and Czechoslovakia (1938) would have been better options. However, when considering the several hindrances to these alternatives including political and public stance, financial difficulties and the depth of pacifist objection, it appears that appeasement was the only realistic option.

Assess the view that appeasement was the only realistic option for British policy towards Germany between 1936 and 1938

Allied victory in 1945 was not always inevitable. Richard Overy comments in Why the Allies Won that ‘no rational man in early 1942 would have guessed at the eventual outcome of the war’ . The key aspect for the Allies in winning the war was the defeat of Hitler’s Germany. Despite evidence suggesting allied victory was achieved through military might alone, this essay will argue that victory in 1945 was down to a multitude of factors and cannot be solely attributed to the use of military. Therefore, other important influences with changed a possible German victory into an inevitable Allied victory which will be discussed include the entry of the USA into the war with its huge population and industrial capacity. In addition, the failure of

Throughout the years 1933-1939, the Nazis consolidated and strengthened their power over the German people in a number of ways. The debate as to whether they depended on their broad popularity or on terror has been argued by historians ever since. The view given by Gellately in Source 4 strongly agrees with that in the question, whereas Evans, in Source 5 combines the terror and popularity aspects of the regime and says that the German people perceived terror as being popular. Johnson presents the view that the selective nature of Nazi terror created a sense of security for German citizens who should have nothing to worry about. However, on any level it

Appeasement may be regarded as a philosophy of the maintenance of peace; in political terms it refers to policy of conciliation with a potential aggressor, often with implications of sacrifice of principles (Oxford Dictionary). The policy of appeasement is one in which both Britain and France and many other nations took towards Nazi Germany and its expansionist aims during the late 1930s, it is one of the most controversial and criticized foreign policies in history (Gelernter D 2002:22). This paper argues that the appeasement policy was for most nations around the world in the 1930s a less challenging way to deal with the problem of Hitler. Nowadays it is a common view that if Britain and France would have taken a harder line against the

The first source that will be evaluated is J. Noakes and G. Pridham’s documentary “Hitler’s War | 1939”, created in 2001. The origin of this source is valuable because Professor Adam Tooze is a British historian and was Reader in Modern European Economic History at the University of Cambridge and professor at Yale University. He also wrote a book that provides an interpretation of the dramatic period of statistical innovation between 1900 and the end of World War II. Sir Richard John Evans, FBA, FRSL, FRHistS is a British academic and historian, best known for his research on the history of Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly the Third Reich. He wrote several books about history of Germany and Hitler. Furthermore this source represents a clear point of view and evidence about Hitler’s dreams and beliefs for Germany because Professor Tooze and Sir Richard J. Evans are experts in European Economic and history of Germany. However this source is limited in that Professor Tooze argues that all Hitler wanted from war was to create a new master race to create a stronger Germany but Sir Evans argues that Hitler’s dream was to conquer eastern europe to create an

Moreover, while Jews in Germany were being tormented and war was approaching, Great Britain did not want to take part. Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of the British from 1937-1940, decided to sign an appeasement “a peace treaty” with Hitler stating that the British only wanted peace (Neufeldt, 109). However, Hitler already had his plans, and the

Appeasement, a foreign policy particularly prevalent in the period of time leading up until the outbreak of World War Two, undoubtedly played a role in the ignition of the second world war, however the extent if this role and the impact it had a cause for the war is debatable. Appeasement was a policy employed as a preventative measure to stop the outbreak of war, at a time when the horrors of the First World War were still affecting European society, and involved making concessions to the opposition, in this case Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. Whilst it is clear that Appeasement was a failure as it did not manage to prevent the outbreak of another war, some historians argue that it in fact was one of the causes of the war. This aspect of the debate was ignited in 1961 by notable historian A.J.P. Taylor, when he asserted1 that the outbreak of War in Europe in 1939 was as much the fault of the politicians of Europe and their persistence with Appeasement, which gradually allowed Hitler and Nazi Germany more freedom then the terms dictated in the Treaty of Versailles and eventually paved the way for militarization and the outbreak of war, as it was in fact Nazi Germany’s. The most commonly accepted views of Appeasement are that of Historians such as Norman Rich who asserted2 that Nazi ideology and Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy made the outbreak of war unavoidable. However, to form a conclusion about these debates, we must first understand the policy of Appeasement and its

For the decision-makers like Chamberlain became more critical to create favourable links with Germany. There were few reasons for that such as improving diplomatic ties with Germany, for instance, preserving peace in Europe, avoiding of any future dispute with Germany or even having potential partner against the Soviet Union, which was less desirable ally for Britain than Germany was. Overall, it seemed that British appeasing was more advantageous that time, because the war itself would have brought too many risks. The 1930s was a demanding period of the time and the British Empire became facing the emerging rivals. To solve some threats, there was need to find some compromise or at least to choose lesser

The choice between neutrality and intervention was not an easy one; either choice would lead to more choices. The question dealt with several issues, and it was difficult to read the conflict amidst threatening demands of angry belligerents. England had to guess the future in order to make a wise decision while balancing interests at home (Randall and Donald 355).

Rearmament was a popular move in Germany. It boosted Nazi support. Hitler also knew that Britain had some sympathy for Germany on this issue, as Britain believed that the limits put on Germany’s armed forces by the Treaty of Versailles were too strict. It was clear that the permitted forces were not enough to defend Germany from attack. Also, Britain thought that Germany would be a good buffer against Communism.

Because Hitler’s vision did not translate into an effective strategic plan, with clear strategic objectives a disconnect between what Germany wanted to achieve (ends), the way it wanted to achieve it (ways), and the resources it would choose to utilize (means) was created. As such, it is this disconnection that also played a large role in Germany’s failure to translate its tactical and operational victories into strategic success and overall victory. Examples of this disconnect and the calamitous effects are clearly present in a quick analysis of the Battle of Britain.