Mission Specific Outcomes Analysis

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The Balancing Role of the Profession Leaders, is challenging. U.S Army strategic leader’s main objective one, balancing the link of the Army current situation and its future area of operation. Profession leaders understand, if balance is not meet, the Army cannot function at its

Four years ago, Capt. (P) Raymond Kuderka was considering different options for a broadening assignment as a senior captain. With so many opportunities available in the Army, Kuderka was searching for guidance on which broadening assignment would bolster his company-grade development and support his career goals. Many of his peers were applying to graduate degrees, fellowships, and MI Programs. But none of these options were appealing.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

They represent a finely balanced combination of high-level thinkers, accomplished warfighters, and geopolitical military experts”. The US Army War College (USAWC) educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level. It will force you to move from beyond the operational/tactical level to the strategic level. This is be much more difficult than it sounds. For the last 28 years I have been working at the tactical/operational level. I was an enlisted combat engineer, patriot missile officer and now a Chaplain. That is where I’m comfortable and what I know best. Taking in to consideration that I am a Chaplain and not on the exact career path as much of my fellow students. How do I navigate this

The U.S. Constitution provides power to the President and Congress to develop and enact national security policy (Ulrich, 1). As such our civilian leaders have the right and responsibility to maintain oversight of the military. Two civil-military relations theories, Normal and Clausewitzian, offer competing views. The Normal theory suggests officers are professionals and interference from civilian leaders is inappropriate (Cohen, 4). The Clausewitzian theory contends the statesman may inject himself in any aspect of military strategy since

Why would not qualified military leaders bring a sober voice about the risks of using military power? In the case where it cannot be avoided, plan a winning strategy that mitigates the risk to our warriors, and a win for the USA?

Deciding whether or not to deploy troops into a foreign nation is one issue, democratic legislature, bound by its long and arduous methods, cannot swiftly refine the details of such an important undertaking: the details of such an important undertaking: the number of troops, the duration of the deployment, the withdrawal strategy, and other essential considerations. Moreover, foreign policy tends to require a long-term strategy that is interwoven with domestic policy, but the party and priorities represented in the White House shift with nearly every presidential election. Finally, because foreign policy requires decisions to be made regarding the behavior of other nations, which is often beyond America’s control and complete understanding, the nation must act creatively and flexibly when unforeseen obstacles arrive. Harlan Cleveland, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, summed up this problem well: “We know in our hearts that we are in the world for keeps, yet we are still tackling twenty-year problems with five-year plans staffed with two-year personnel with one-year appropriations” (Fulbright

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

I believe that as a strategic planner he began formulating the plan and laying the groundwork for it as soon as he entered the job. Schwarzkopf explains in his autobiography that upon becoming the CENTCOM Commander he attempted to educate himself on the intricacies of the region by attending a course similar to one that a state department diplomat would attend. He says, “I sat in the front row, taking copious notes on cultures, customs, oil issues, water issues, and religious conflicts.” He did this to gain an understanding of his environment and to allow him to identify existing and future issues or problems. He quickly initiated the building of military to military relations with as many nations as he could. He set the vision for the staff and laid the groundwork to reach a goal of arranging access to crucial airfields, harbors, and military bases in the event of war. These steps and actions resulted from his updated frame of reference, that the threat to the United States’ interests was the Middle East, rather than the Soviet Union. In order to develop the war plan he successfully navigated the joint, interagency, and political environments to build consensus and ultimately include the Middle East in the upcoming Defense Planning Guidance. In stark contrast, my experience to date, as a planner has been very short sighted and focused on tactical and operational objectives for an Aviation Task Force or how to most effectively employ aviation assets in support of a domestic flood operation. I realize that while assignments and experience may influence the way I think it is essential to begin developing these critical thinking skills in order to be able to advise leaders at a strategic level. While I find the transition to a strategic planner challenging, it pales when I consider that of a strategic

Adaptive leadership is becoming widespread in the United States Army amongst junior officers in leadership positions that require quick thinking and innovation. Leonard Wong discusses how the versatile and unpredictable enemy and situations in Iraq produces adaptable junior officers. These officers are learning to make decisions under chaotic conditions and are becoming more mentally agile. The Army is changing. The Army is transforming its capabilities in the war in Iraq to be effective and successful. General Schoomaker states that we will not accomplish our goals as a nation in the 21st century unless our Army becomes much more agile but with the capacity for long term, sustained level of conflict. The Army is in the process of

The Joint Publication 3-07.3 clearly specifies that mission analysis is an integral part in accomplishing “peacekeeping” planning and operations. Furthermore, it is highly imperative to plan for peace enforcement operations by means of mission analysis, which is designed to identify constraints/restraints, force structure, objectives (end state), and etc… The mission analysis along with intelligence will afford leadership with enough knowledge that will enable them to develop the correct force structure to ensure mission accomplishment.

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution