Thucydides Reasons For War

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

The invasion and the war in Iraq remains a continuous topic of divisiveness and sensitivity in today’s America. One of the negative evaluation of the war is attributed to the false impression of the length of the war which lasted seven years, not six months as presumed in 2003. As the invasion initiated, the ideologies of American government then failed to perceive the large number of troops required, casualties and the financial toll in the interest of the preventive war doctrine. However, when weighing the failures of this war, there are successes brought home that relate mostly to the lessons the American military and the government learned with the use of counterinsurgency tactics after “winning the hearts and minds” of Iraqis (Young). Nevertheless, with evaluation through levels of analysis, the accomplished agenda of ending Saddam Hussein’s regime justifies success and failure, mutually.

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

While almost the entire Iraq war was mired in controversy, no one moment was more inundated with it than the Second Battle of Fallujah, a two month knock down drag out fight between coalition forces and radical Jihadists, it was the war’s magnum opus with urban combat rivaling what Marines faced in 1968 on the streets of Hue city Vietnam during the Tet offensive (Head, 105). While many debate the war overall the focus of this essay is on the battle itself and how the US government created the circumstances in which the insurgency in Fallujah could flourish as well as the ideology and motives of the Jihadi fighters and US forces and why the battle was necessary for US forces to wage so they could begin the process of bringing western

Thucydides, an Athenian who lived during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), may be one of the earliest western war theorists thanks to his work, History of the Peloponnesian War. His history described the conflict between ancient Athens and Sparta. In doing so, he authored one of the most balanced and powerful explanations of the causes of war.

In General Petraeus' Opening Statement to the Joint House Committee on Iraq, General Petraeus covers a summary of the surge and its effects, the nature of the conflict in Iraq, the situation before the surge, the current situation, and explains his recommendations to his leadership on the future of Iraq. This speech, or statement by title, was made as part of an update following the commencement of the surge. General Petraeus' speech, while lacking in non-verbal communicative properties, was extremely effective when paired with its topical organization and logos proofs.

Herodotus and Thucydides were historians who dramatically influenced the way we look at Greek history and warfare. The two historians approach their stories in completely different ways, which ultimately leads to different explanations of the origins of conflict. Herodotus focuses on recalling the origins of the Ionian Revolt, the rise of the Persian Empire, and the Persian Wars with Greece, while Thucydides writes about the Peloponnesian War. M.I. Finely suggests, in the introduction of Thucydides’ book that Thucydides is complementing Herodotus by beginning where Herodotus left off (Finley, History of the Peloponnesian War p.16). Although these two historians approach the start of conflicts in different ways, it seems that Thucydides is not suggesting that Herodotus’ explanations are wrong. While evaluating conflicts of warfare, Herodotus provides a less bias perspective than Thucydides, but Thucydides is able to understand the underlying causes of wars better due to the fact that he is writing about warfare that he was alive for.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Within days of Iraqi forces invading Kuwait in 1990, President Bush publicly backed the United Nations’ (UN) stance on the incursion with four national strategic objectives and determined that, ‘if invited, US forces would be deployed to deter further Iraqi attacks, defend Saudi Arabia and enforce UN resolutions.’ From the national strategic objectives, the military end-state is deduced. The military end-state is a conceptual element of operational design which describes the conditions that forces must achieve to attain strategic objectives/ hand over main effort responsibilities. The military end-state does not necessarily indicate the end of a military activities to attain national objectives. While one specific national objective would not

Thucydides was born 460 B.C and died 395. He was born in Alimos greece and died in Athens greece.Thucydides was the author of the history of the Peloponnesian war and what he said it started because Athens was to greedy.According to History.com Thucydides chronicled nearly 30 years of war and tension between sparta and Athens.Thucydides is important for our world because without the Peloponnesian war are democracy wouldn’t be the same like it was back then we pretty much would have a different world without this war and with Thucydides writing about it that helped even more.Life would be definitely different if we didn’t have this person because this guy was mainly the reason why we had this war to begin with and are democracy would look very different today.Thucydides played a big part in the people in war like he was the cause of the first preemptive attack by the spartans and was the cause of all of this getting started by him thinking Athens is being greedy.With Thucydides is luck athens won the Peloponnesian war which causes Athens democracy and spartans democracy to change.So, all in all thucydides was pretty much the leader of the athens in the Peloponnesian war.Thucydides is best known for writing the history of Peloponnesian war this is really what made him famous.Thucydides is one of the greatest ancient greek historians according to britannica.com.

Thucydides was born in 460 B.C.E in a noble family, which was linked to Athens and its leaders. He was one of the greatest ancient Greek historians and author of the History of the Peloponnesian War, in which he describes the struggle between Athens and Sparta.

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

Besides this classic security dilemma Thucydides describes in Book I Section 23, he also presents different variations of this realist theory.