In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.
Leibniz’s law of identity states that mental and physical states are not identical, and cannot be the same entity because they do not share the same traits. The notion of sameness(considered Leibniz’s law) serves to present a case where if A equals B, then A and B share all the same properties. Even
…show more content…
One statement is that mental states can’t be true or false unlike where physical states can. One cannot say that it's false to obtain love or it's true to obtain love. You cannot compare the mental state to a physical state being the mental state is a different state of dimension. Using introspection, one can say that he knows his mind via introspection, but he cannot know his brain via introspection. This means that both mental and physical states are indeed different. This means that you cannot translate neural activity that is firing in your brain, but you can translate thoughts, beliefs, and desires that are in your mind. This difference of the mental state in opposite of the physical state validities the argument that dualist
I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and
In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.
The mind-brain identity theory is an ontological perspective which centers around the idea that the mind can be closely associated with the brain to be considered the same. In other words, a person’s mind processes are coherent with their brain processes. It is a significant topic included in the philosophy of mind. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the identity theory of mind is “to the effect that these experiences just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes”. In this
In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.
In this paper, I will argue that the Memory Theory of Personal Identity is the closest to the truth. I will do so by showing that the opposing theories – Body and Soul Theories – have evident flaws and that the
For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.
In John Locke’s argument for personal identity, he believes that we are not substances or mere souls. In his argument, Locke stresses to convey that there is a crucial difference between distinguishing a “man” and a “person” (Locke 221). According to Locke’s definition, a man is a living body which is homogenous to an animal’s body. Therefore, any living body of a particular shapes refers to a “man.” Locke emphasizes that a “person” is a sensible being that is aware of its own
Dualism claims that the mind is a distinct nonphysical thing, a complete entity that is independent of any physical body to which it is temporarily attached.
Furthermore if mental states are properties of physical matter in the same way that physical states are, then how is it so that we can scientifically measure physical properties, but not the mental sates that they give rise to? It seems highly problematic for property dualism to claim that there are facts that cannot be measured scientifically; and this issue also renders the theory unfalsifiable.
Plutarch brings up the question of bodily identity and numerical identity in Theseus. Theseus’ ship needs repairs and so he begins to replace the old parts, piece by piece, building an additional ship with the old pieces. In the end he has two ships, one old and one new. Both have the same function, and form, and are therefore qualitatively identical, however the question
The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound
Leibniz’s Law supports dualism through three main arguments: the Indubitable Existence Argument, the Extension Argument, and the Divisibility Argument. Lane summarizes the three arguments as follows:
Leibniz claims that these type truths can be supplemented by his Principle of Contradiction (PC). PC states that anything which implies a contradiction is false. Hence, if people disagree with the claim (i) ‘I am always identical to myself’ they would be claiming a falsehood. I can immediately point out that they are stating a contradiction—i.e. ‘A is not A’ contradicts ‘A is A’.
The metaphysical picture conveyed in the works of Leibniz is especially difficult to decipher, given the scattering of his views among numerous papers and their profound interconnection with one another. In this paper, the “World Apart Doctrine” will be explicated as it appears in Section 14 of the Discourse on Metaphysics. As this excerpt alone is insufficient in explaining the role the thesis plays in Leibniz's view as a whole, it will be broken down and analyzed as it relates to connected doctrines, namely those of “Universal Expression,” “Pre-Established Harmony,” and “Predicate-In-Notion.” The compatibility of the World Apart doctrine with each of these fundamental views will be considered, and it will be argued that, in all three cases,
This is the doctrine which the mind-brain identity theory denies and seeks to refute. Its counter-claim is that mind and brain are one and the same entity, in short, that mental states are brain states. Why, then, from this perspective, has the dualist been mistaken? He may have been confused into believing that one thing is two things by the fact that it has two names. For example, while the Morning Star and the Evening Star appear by their different names to denote different things, in fact, astronomical studies reveal them to be the same (in fact, the planet Venus). Water is a different name from H20 but there is no difference at all in the physical substance which both names label. Scientific research has revealed previously hidden identities: that the temperature of a gas is the mean kinetic energy of its molecules; that light is electromagnetic radiation. In a similar way research in neuroscience is expected to show that the sound of a vacuum cleaner, a pang of hunger, the taste of mustard are nothing more or less than the firing of certain neurons.