Property Dualism

In essence, Cartesian Dualism attempts to solve the mind-body problem – that is, what is the relationship between the mind and the body? The answer, according to this theory, is that the mind and the body are two distinctly different substances that constitute each person. Here, “mind” can be described as a nonphysical thing that thinks and “body” as a living physical thing that does not think. The mind can also exist independently of the body, and both can causally affect one another.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

The defense of dualism stems from two questions. First, is a human being composed of just one ultimate component or two? The second asks if the answer is two, how do these two relate to one another? This idea starts Moreland argument for dualism over physicalism. Physicalism is a worldview that states that

In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.

In this essay, I will discuss and formally analyze the opinions in approval of substance dualism and conclude that substance dualism is without a doubt an accurate way of thinking. Firstly, it is important to describe what exactly what I mean by substance dualism. Basically, it asks a very menial question such as: what kind of thing is our mind? According to substance dualists aka Descartes, "the mind and the body are composed of different substances and that the mind is a thinking thing that lacks the usual attributes of physical objects such as size, shape, location etc." [Descartes] Substance dualism is then tested by different opinions which in return vouch for its soundness.

Keep in mind that a substance dualist argues that mental entities can exist separately from physical entities, and that physical entities can exist separately from mental entities. However, for there to be changes in a physical form, the object causing those changes must have two features that nonphysical objects lack: a spatial location and the ability to transfer energy. This is because in the process of physical causation, energy is being transferred from one location to another. There are many examples in which energy has been transferred from one spatial location to another. For example, when a stationary book on a table is being pushed, energy from the person pushing is being transferred to the book, which causes the book to move.

Substance dualism is a never ending argument in the Philosophy world as it’s been going on for decades. It is the view that the universe contains two important types of entity which is mental and material. The structure of this paper is that four main argument leads to one conclusion. Firstly, I’ll argue about Descartes’s ‘separability argument’ which stands as the definition of Substance Dualism. Secondly, I’ll argue that mental and physical have different and perhaps irreconcilable properties. An argument is not complete without a counter argument which in this case the “pairing” problem that exists in Descartes theory is highlighted and where is the interaction of material and immaterial takes

In denying that the mind and mental properties, like qualia, are nonphysical things, mind-brain theory objects to both substance and property dualism. Therefore it is a physicalist approach to the philosophy of

One statement is that mental states can’t be true or false unlike where physical states can. One cannot say that it's false to obtain love or it's true to obtain love. You cannot compare the mental state to a physical state being the mental state is a different state of dimension. Using introspection, one can say that he knows his mind via introspection, but he cannot know his brain via introspection. This means that both mental and physical states are indeed different. This means that you cannot translate neural activity that is firing in your brain, but you can translate thoughts, beliefs, and desires that are in your mind. This difference of the mental state in opposite of the physical state validities the argument that dualist

There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.

After Paul Churchland’s thorough reviews on several different theories on the nature of the mind, and after consideration of their pros and cons, he advocates Eliminative Materialism.

I am faced with the philosophical task of defending either dualism or materialism, depending on which one is most attractive to me. So either I support the theory of dualism, which is the belief that there is both a physical and a spiritual state, or I believe in materialism, which is the belief that everything that exists is material or physical. Although I believe materialism to be easier to prove, I find dualism more attractive to believe. Throughout the following, I will attempt to build a case for the theory of dualism giving insights both documented and personal. I will also shed light on the theory of materialism and the proofs that support this theory; showing that

It can be very difficult to find a universal proposal that offers a solution to the mind body problem. While solutions to this problem differ greatly, all attempt to answer questions such as: What makes a mental state mental? What is the fundamental nature of the mental? Or more specifically speaking, what makes a thought a thought? Or what makes a pain a pain? In an attempt to answer these questions, many philosophers over the centuries have rejected, proposed, or altered preexisting theories in order to keep up with the thinking and science of their times. Entering the 21st century their still exit a plethora of theories, some stronger than others, which include Cartesian dualism, physicalism,

According to Gilbert Ryle, the explanation was possible. Dualism and its variations are false, and the dualist commits a ‘category mistake’, that is, a property is wrongly associated to something which cannot possess that property. He illustrates two examples to simplify his view. The first is the concept of

“Substance dualism, such as traditional Cartesian dualism (Descartes 1644), asserts the existence of both physical and non-physical substances. Such theories entail the existence of non-physical minds or selves as entities in which consciousness inheres. Though substance dualism is at present largely out of favor, it does have some contemporary proponents (Swinburne 1986, Foster 1989, 1996). “(Stanford)