The Mind Brain Identity Theory

In his writings, “A Contemporary Defense of Dualism,” J.P. Moreland argues the point that the mind and brain are separate from each other. It seems as a quick thought that both are the same. However, the mind deals with ideas, thoughts and hopes. The brain is made up of the neural process. Throughout the entire argument, Moreland tries to prove the theory of physicalism, which is the idea that only things that exist are composed of matter. His explanation is that the soul doesn’t exist and the brain controls everything.

The zombie argument presents an idea meant to prove that consciousness doesn’t necessarily logically supervene on the physical. In this example there exists a zombie, defined as “someone or something physically identical to me ( or any other conscious being) but lacking conscious experiences altogether.” (Chalmers,94) Zombie world is then defined as “a world physically identical to ours,but in which there are no conscious experiences at all. In such a world, everyone is a zombie.” (Chalmers, 94) In this idea, only “phenomenal zombies” are to be considered meaning zombies that are “physically and functionally identical ( as us) , but which lack experience” (Chalmers 95) There are five main arguments that stand behind this idea, the first two being ideas regarding conceivability, the second two arguments of epistemology and the fifth and argument of analysis.

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

The mind-brain identity theory is an ontological perspective which centers around the idea that the mind can be closely associated with the brain to be considered the same. In other words, a person’s mind processes are coherent with their brain processes. It is a significant topic included in the philosophy of mind. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the identity theory of mind is “to the effect that these experiences just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes”. In this

When contemplating the relationship between the mind and body, most philosophers advocate either dualism, the view that the mind and body belong to the mental and physical categories respectively, or physicalism, the stance that there is only the physical. (Gertler 108) Brie Gertler upholds the former perspective, and her essay In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism aims to disprove physicalism by establishing the possibility of experiencing pain without the firing of C-fibers, which physicalists believe is identical to pain. (110) She claims that thought experiments are best for determining matters of possibility, but only if such experiments utilize “sufficiently comprehensive” concepts. After first clarifying why Gertler emphasizes the need for

In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.

Identity is anything that can provide us with a way of answering what we are. I believe that there is a core basis of

The distinction of so-called “hard” and “easy” problems demonstrates the fallacy of any argument lacking more in-depth inquiry and reasoning (i.e., ignorance). The argument based upon such ignorance in the “hard problem” is such that the mysterious nature of consciousness is derived from an ill-defined concept that in reality is more question-begging than conclusive. Churchland believes that consciousness must be explained through empirical possibilities, not logical possibilities. Much of the argument from ignorance relies on thought problems relating to possibility; and then thought-experiments that rely on a degree of guesswork and, reflection, simply because of scientific limitations at any given time. For instance, in the zombie argument people are told to imagine the human brain as identical to a zombie, yet different in qualia.

Identity theorists hold the view that the mental events are nothing more than neurological activity of the brain. This theory is a subtype of the materialist view because the human mind

The id, the ego and the superego are another prominent theory that acts off of the conscious and un-conscious mind. Freudian psychology initiates with a earth full of objects. Among them is a exceptional object, the organism. An extremely meaningful portion of the organism is the nervous system. At birth, the nervous system is a little many than of else animals, an “it”

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.

unexplainable being that he called the mind. Sober sums up, that the Identity Theory is a