9: Suppose there are two restaurants on an island, Ace's (A) and Betty's (B). Theyboth have to decide how many meals, qa and qB, to sell per day. For Q= qA + ¶B,the market demand function for meals isp = 120 – Q||Both restaurants face a marginal cost per meal of $30.(1) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices.(2) What if the restaurants decide to form a cartel and split the production andprofits evenly. How much will each firm produce and what price do theycharge?(3) Suppose they competed with prices instead of quantities. Find the Bertrandequilibrium quantities and prices.(4) Find the deadweight loss of Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, andof the cartel outcome. Then rank each of these from least deadweight loss tomost deadweight loss.For the rest of the problem, assume firms compete in quantities (Cournot) and thereis no cartel.(5) Suppose Betty's marginal cost per meal increases to $60. Ace's marginal costremains at $30. What are the new Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices?

Since we only answer up to 2 sub-parts for complex questions, we’ll answer the first 2. Please…

9: Suppose there are two restaurants on an island, Ace's (A) and Betty's (B). They both have to decide how many meals, qa and qb, to sell per day. For Q = qa + qB, the market demand function for meals is p= 120 – Q Both restaurants face a marginal cost per meal of $30. (1) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices. (2) What if the restaurants decide to form a cartel and split the production and profits evenly. How much will each firm produce and what price do they charge?

9: Suppose there are two restaurants on an island, Ace's (A) and Betty's (B). They both have to decide how many meals, qa and qb, to sell per day. For Q = qa + qB, the market demand function for meals is p= 120 – Q Both restaurants face a marginal cost per meal of $30. (1) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices. (2) What if the restaurants decide to form a cartel and split the production and profits evenly. How much will each firm produce and what price do they charge?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

6. Two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2 and are competing in quantities. The demand they are facing is given by p=1-91-92, with p being the price of the good, and 9₁ and 92 the quantities produced by firm 1 and 2 respectively. The total cost of firm 1 is TC1 (91) = 9₁ and the one of firm 2 is TC₂ (92) = 292. (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium. (b) The government decides that it wants to make the market more competitive. As such it decides to offer to Firm 1 a license to become the leader in the market. The licence costs F, and if Firm 1 buys it, it will be allowed to choose its quantity before Firm 2. What is the maximum Firm 1 would be willing to pay for this license?
(5) For each situation, solve for the Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium (differentiated Product). 5a) Suppose Sarah's constant marginal cost is $5 but Joe's is $8 Recall that in a Bertrand model with differentiated product, each supplier faces his/her own demand: Qjoe = 100 – 10 Pjoe + 5 Psarah Qsarah = 100 – 10 Psarah + 5 Pjoe 5b) Suppose Joe and Sarah have the same cost functions as earlier (constant MC of $5) but asymmetric demand functions Qjoe = 100 – 10 Pjoe + 5 Psarah Qsarah = 160 - 10 Psarah + 5 Pjoe
The inverse market demand for fax paper is given by P=100-Q. There are two firms who produce fax paper. Firm 1 has a cost of production of C1= 15*Q1 and firm 2 has a cost of production of C2=20*Q2 a) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compute simultaneously in quantities. What are the Cournot quantities and prices?What are the profits of firm 1 and 2?b) Suppose firm 1 and firm 2 compete simultaneously in prices. What are the Bertrand quantities and prices?What are the profits of firm 1 and 2?
Suppose you are trying to determine the pricing for popcorn at a movie theater. There are just two types of customers (for simplicity assume just two total customers). One customer has a low demand for popcorn and will pay $1.00 for 16 oz of popcorn and nothing for a second 16oz. The high demand customer will pay $1.25 for the first 16oz and $0.50 for the second 16oz. If you charge one price for every 16oz a customer buys, what would you charge?
5. Consider a single manufacturer (M) and a single retailer (R). Suppose the final demand function is Q=20-4p. M produces at AC=MC=2. The game is played out as below: In stage 1, M decides the wholesale price pw. In stage 2, R decides the retail price pr to consumers. a. Find the values of pr and pw in equilibrium b. Suppose M and R vertically integrate. Find the optimal price for the integrated firm
11. Application: Elasticity and hotel rooms The following graph input tool shows the daily demand for hotel rooms at the Peacock Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. To help the hotel management better understand the market, an economist identified three primary factors that affect the demand for rooms each night. These demand factors, along with the values corresponding to the initial demand curve, are shown in the following table and alongside the graph input tool. (Note: All values are hypothetical.) Demand Factor Initial Value Average Canadian household income $50,000 per year Round trip airfare from Toronto (YYZ) to Las Vegas (LAS) $100 per round trip Room rate at the Grandiose Hotel and Casino, which is near the Peacock $250 per night Use the graph input tool to help you answer the following questions. You will not be scored on any changes you make to this graph. оп апy Note: Once you enter a value in a white field, the graph and any corresponding amounts in each grey field…
An industry consists of two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. The demand function for the product of each firmsis given by q1 = 720 - 3p1 + 2p2 and q2 = 720 - 3p2 + 2p1. We assume for simplicity that the totalcost of production is zero:TC1 =TC2 =0. a) Are these two products substitutes or complements? Assuming that firms compete over prices, find theprice best-response functions for firm 1 and fin 2. Draw a diagram that shows the BRFs and theequilibrium. Are prices strategic substitutes or complements? Find the Bertrand Nash equilibrium inprices and outputs. Obtain the profits of each firm. b) Show that the duopolists have incentives to collude. Find their joint profit-maximizing price, output, andprofit: find each firm's price. output and protit. Is collusion a Nash equilibrium? If not, what is the optimaldefection for each firm? Show this game in a 2X2 matrix form. What does this imply about the Nashequilibrium or the stability of their collusive agreement? Is it a Prisoner's Dilemma…
Exercise A.9 In a market only two firms produce a homogeneous good. You work on one of them and are tasked with drawing up the production strategy for the coming year. The two companies in the market have the same information and the objective of both is the maximization of their profit. You know: the inverse market demand curve of the good: P(Q)=200-2Q where Q = q₁ + q₂ , the function that represents the costs of your company and the rival company: C(qᵢ) = 20qᵢ (for i=1, 2), and the data in the following table, with the optimal decisions according to the different types of competition:C(qᵢ) = 20qᵢ and the data in the following table, with the optimal decisions according to the different types of competition: q1 q2 P Bertrand 45 45 20 Cournot 30 30 80 Collusion 22,5 22,5 110 a) What is more in your company's interest to compete or cooperate with the rival company? Keep in mind that explicit collusion agreements are illegal, so each…
1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.
Suppose that there are two firms operating in the market of laptops, the first firm supplies quantity qi and the second firm supplies q2. The inverse demand function for laptops is P(q1 +q2)=2,000-2(q₁ +q2). The marginal costs are constant and equal to $400. a. b. c. Find the Cournot equilibrium outputs and price. Find the Bertrand equilibrium outputs and price. Suppose that the first firm is the leader choosing the output first, and the second firm is the follower choosing the output after observing the firm firm's choice. Find the new equilibrium output and price and compare them with those in parts a and b. Which of the equilibria is socially preferable?
Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine, as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 2 depict, when there are at least two pricing periods expected? Table A Drone Operator Jasmine LOW Price Drone Operator Jasmine HIGH Price Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price Andrew Low Jasmine Low Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Table 2 Pricing Strategy Scenario TABLE 2 First Period First Price Choice Period (High or Profit Low) $1,000 $1,000 Drone Operator Andrew HIGH Price Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit…
Jane and Sara are competing orange juice salespersons in Amherst. Their stands are next to each other on a street and consumers regard them as identical. The marginal cost of an orange juice is $1. The demand for orange juice every hour is Q = 20 − P where P is the lowest price between the two salespersons. If their prices are equal they split demand equally. a. If they set prices simultaneously (prices can be any real number), what is the Nash equilibrium price? b. If, against what we have assumed in class, orange juice salespersons have to charge prices in whole dollars ($1, $2, $3, etc), what are the Nash equilibrium prices? c. Assuming whole dollar pricing, if Jane sets her price before Sara, what price would she charge? Answer all 3 parts