Two firms that make different but similar products compete, with demands of D1(P1, P2) = 72 - 2P1 + P2 and D2(P1, P2)= 82 -3P, + 2P1. Their marginal costs are constant: MC, - 2 and MC2 = 4. In the Bertrand equilibrium outcome, Firm 1!3!would charge P1and Firm 2 would charge P2If Firm 1 to acquire Firm 2, itwould charge P1and Firm 2 would charge P2.(Please enter all answersrounded to whole numbers, without commas or decimals.)

D1 = 72 - 2p1 + p2 D2 = 82 - 3p2 + 2p1 MC1 = 2 MC2 = 4

Two firms that make different but similar products compete, with demands of D1(P1, P2) = 72 - 2P1 + P2 and D2(P1, P2- 82 -3P2 + 2P1. Their marginal costs are constant: MC1 - 2 and MC2 = 4. In the Bertrand equilibrium outcome, Firm 1 %3D would charge P1 = , and Firm 2 would charge P2 = If Firm 1 to acquire Firm 2, it would charge P1 and Firm 2 would charge P2 = (Please enter all answers rounded to whole numbers, without commas or decimals.)

Two firms that make different but similar products compete, with demands of D1(P1, P2) = 72 - 2P1 + P2 and D2(P1, P2- 82 -3P2 + 2P1. Their marginal costs are constant: MC1 - 2 and MC2 = 4. In the Bertrand equilibrium outcome, Firm 1 %3D would charge P1 = , and Firm 2 would charge P2 = If Firm 1 to acquire Firm 2, it would charge P1 and Firm 2 would charge P2 = (Please enter all answers rounded to whole numbers, without commas or decimals.)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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