2 Now consider a three-firm Bertrand (pricing competition) model, where the market demand equation is Pa150-Q, every firm's marginal cost is30, and there is no fixea cost. Consumers only buy from the firm charging the lowest price. if there are multiple firms charging the same lowestprice, then they will share the market equally.If firm 1 charges p1 100, and firm 2 charges p2-95, what price p3 below will be the best response for firm 37OA 95OR 94.99Oc 89.99OD 99.99OE 100None of the other answers are correct.OF90G.

In the Bertrand model, all firms in the market choose their price simultaneously. If the product is…

Now consider a three-firm Bertrand (pricing competition) model, where the market demand equation is P150-Q, every firm's marginal cost 30, and there is no fixed cost. Consumers only buy from the firm charging the lowest price. if there are multiple firmns charging the same lowes price, then they will share the market equally If firm 1 charges p1=100, and firm 2 charges p2-95, what price p3 below will be the best response for firm 37 OA 95 OR 94.99 OC 89.99 OD 99.99 OE 100 OF None of the other answers are correct. G. 90

Now consider a three-firm Bertrand (pricing competition) model, where the market demand equation is P150-Q, every firm's marginal cost 30, and there is no fixed cost. Consumers only buy from the firm charging the lowest price. if there are multiple firmns charging the same lowes price, then they will share the market equally If firm 1 charges p1=100, and firm 2 charges p2-95, what price p3 below will be the best response for firm 37 OA 95 OR 94.99 OC 89.99 OD 99.99 OE 100 OF None of the other answers are correct. G. 90

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)

9th Edition

ISBN:9781305260948

Author:Irvin B. Tucker

Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ

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