Military Strategy Research Paper

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

Originally influenced by the strategic events seen throughout the Napoleonic Wars in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the nine principles of war derived from the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations” outline a basic strategic guide on waging war. Shortly before the military adopted these guidelines, however, the United States of America saw civil unrest as the Southern states seceded to form the Confederate States of America. As the Union Army of the North battled the Confederate Army of the South, strategic principles similar to those outlined in the U.S. Army’s doctrine began to appear on the battlefield. Although the armies of the Union and the Confederacy both utilized strategic elements outlined in the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations”, the Union army’s stricter adherence to certain strategic principles resulted in their ultimate success.

The transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) environment we face today requires strategic direction and guidance from the President (POTUS), Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to allow the Combatant Commander (CCDR) of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to employ his Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) across the conflict continuum. In the following paragraphs, the above statement will be supported by the USEUCOM CCDR’s operational approach of developing broad strategic and operational concepts into specific mission tasks to show his TCP is linked to and supports U.S. national interests. To do so, examples of U.S. strategic guidance documents incorporated within the linkage will be presented. Lastly, a current engagement activity that is linked to a U.S. national interest in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey (GAAT) will be discussed to express the range of military operations USEUCOM faces.

A method by which the strategy development can be explained is the “strategic lenses”. This method views strategy development as design, experience, ideas and discourse. Strategy as design means that it emerged through rational processes, whereas the experience lens sees the strategy as the outcome of individual and collective experiences. The lens “discourse” sees strategy as the result of communication and concepts. The last lens, which is the idea lens, is about the development of strategy as a result of innovation (Johnson et al, 2008).

Political leaders and civilian advisors usually rely on senior military leaders’ advice and inputs when it comes to use of force. One of many best examples can be General Colin Powell’s well calculated and timely request of sending an extra corps to the Gulf, which eventually helped President Bush and the United States as a whole to achieve national strategic objectives in the first Gulf War . His recommendation to use overwhelming force with definite and attainable objective, and clear exit strategy in that circumstance proved to be the most influencing factor to enable the U.S. led coalition’s swift success . Take away from his brilliant advice to political leaders is that senior military leaders must possess extensive knowledge on military strategy and requirements to succeed as well as they should be courageous enough to express their needs. With that, I really want to improve my knowledge on strategy, strategic level decision making, and factors to shape those decisions while I am here. This will definitely help me to give sound and conversant advice to my national political leaders when time requires to do so in the

These failures ensured a gap between the POTUS’s strategic ends and CENTCOM’s ways and means, this invited strategic risk as defined in JP-5-0. These initial planning deficiencies centered around Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld and CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks. Franks ignored the operational environment addressed in General Anthony Zinni’s OPLAN 1003-98. Zinni and his planners clearly recognized sectarian strife in a power vacuum as a potential Iraqi post invasion problem. , Franks instead relied on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “slices” which, though operationally useful, provided very little strategic value to guide his planners or insight on Bush’s National Strategic Objectives or the needed military end-state to support them. Franks never constructs his own OIF operational design. Without his own original operational design Franks could not refine or develop his own commander’s operational approach. He and his CENTCOM planners never analyzed the elements of operational approach necessary to frame the operational environment or define the problem. These elements included, military end-states, termination, and the center of gravity. Without an original or comprehensive operational approach, neither Franks nor his CENTCOM planners produced a complete or coherent plan that “promoted mutual understanding and unity of effort through out the echelons of command and partner

For Iraq, also failing to begin that endeavor with a clear endstate and what the international community or the United States should do with Iraq after we broke it has proven costly not just to Iraqis and Americans, but now to the stability of the entire region. Unilateral action is always risky and, in this instance, despite our partners in the conflict, it has proven unwise not only for the outcome but for the damage to our strategic influence. Just as Truman and Marshall were concerned about a power vacuum post-WWII enabling Communism to consume Europe, we should have been mindful of the same in 2003. Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam are all reminders that failing to learn from the past, to not consider all the elements of strategy, to not clearly define our endstate and to not commit fully to them remain

Since the Cold War, scholars utilizing a military and state centric approach to the study of regime security such as Paul Williams, Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Walt have made significant contributions to the literature on security studies. While these authors present unique viewpoints, they all tend share the perspective that major international conflict has been a key factor in the development of this field. Stephen Walt pointed out that the idea of security studies first emerged as a result of “civilians becom[ing] extensively involved in military planning for the first time during World War II.” This surge in civilian interest during the war led to an era of security studies known as the “Golden Age” during which Paul Williams indicated that “civilian strategists enjoyed relatively close connections with Western governments and their foreign and security policies.” The enthusiasm for this area of study was maintained for a substantial amount of time due to what Joseph Nye called the “unprecedented nature of security problems confronting the United States”, which were mostly brought about by the advent of the atomic age. Several forces however, would eventually counteract the uptick in interest; principle among them was the negative perception of the Vietnam War. Walt highlighted this idea stating “the debacle in Indochina … made the study of security affairs unfashionable in many universities.” Fortunately for the progression of the field, this

“Strategy is the integrated set of choices that positions the business in its industry so as to generate superior financial returns over the long run.“ – Professor Jan W. Rivkin (lecture 1)

At the outset of the course on the making of strategy we were asked to define strategy. This attempt early on showed the complexities of defining strategy as is evidenced by the opening quote from the book. The process grew rapidly more complex as more readings and perspectives were added. However, approaching the end of the course a handle appeared that would at least allow the student to grasp the basics and speak intelligently in defining strategy.

Strategy is about the creation and allocation of right resources, to the right place, in the right way over time.

This project is about why it is important to apply the strategic management process to business and at the same time will be discussing the importance of strategy for business. This paper will continue to explain the concept of the strategic management process, and will discuss the importance of having a future oriented plan, the organization’s vision, mission, purpose, philosophy, or goals, and the strategic process as input for future decision making. The information gathered will be provided from the ebook, Strategic Management, 12th Edition, Authors, John A. Pearce, II, Villanova University

In an essence, the strategy is beyond a direction or future blueprint for growth & sustain in the global completive environment rather than just an asset of an organization. “The problem of performing strategy, how is it done, who does it and what they use to do it, is so important for both strategy theorists and practitioners. (Jarzabkowski, 2005 :1)

Alfred Chandler(1963) defines strategy as ‘ the determination of the long-run goals and objectives of an enterprise and the adoption of courses of action of an enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals’. And Michael porter(1996) sees it as ‘Competitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value’.

A strategy is said to be a plan that is made for the long term success of a product or brand. It is extremely important to have a strategy in order to figure out a direction towards which any company is able to focus all its resources efficiently and achieve desired outcomes. Formulating effective strategies is a considerably long process in itself that combines analysing several factors, situations and issues that are already present in a company and looking to improve on them alongside trying to implement various innovations and ideas to collectively create a direction towards which they can move and direct the resources available to them.