Consider two identical firms with a unit cost of production of $10 and a market demand of p= 60-y. (a) What is firm 1’s optimal output level as a function of firm 2’s output? (b) What is firm 2’s optimal output level as a function of firm 1’s output? (c) What is the Cournot equilibrium output level for these firms? (d) What is the Cournot equilibrium price level? Show your work step by step.

Consider two identical firms with a unit cost of production of $10 and a market demand of p= 60-y. (a) What is firm 1’s optimal output level as a function of firm 2’s output? (b) What is firm 2’s optimal output level as a function of firm 1’s output? (c) What is the Cournot equilibrium output level for these firms? (d) What is the Cournot equilibrium price level? Show your work step by step.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

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